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Where Shall We Live? Class and the
Limitations of Fair Housing Law
Wendell E. Pritchett*
I. Introduction

IN 1952, JACKIE ROBINSON, STAR OF THE BROOKLYN DODGERS and
the first African-American to play in baseball’s major leagues, decided
to move his family from Long Island to West Chester, New York, or
Connecticut. For over a year, Robinson’s wife, Rachel, searched for a
suitable place for their growing family. During this process, according
to Robinson, the family “became even more acutely aware that racial
prejudice and discrimination in housing is vicious. It doesn’t matter
whether you are a day laborer or a celebrity, as long as you are black.”1
The Robinsons experienced many subtle attempts to prevent them from
buying homes in white neighborhoods. In several circumstances, homes
were taken off the market after they expressed interest. In other instances, the asking price was increased dramatically.2
In the fall of 1953, a reporter for the Bridgeport Herald wrote about
the Robinsons’ plight.3 The story had a major impact on community
leaders in Stamford, many of whom mobilized to counter the accusations. Leading realtors denied the article’s claims and alleged that the
controversy was the “politically inspired” work of the Americans for
Democratic Action and other “rabble rousers.” In December, the community’s leading ministers convened a meeting on the subject, where
they heard from Rachel Robinson, who said that she and her husband
were not “agitators,” just people looking for a nice place to live.4
The ministers decided to circulate among their congregations a statement affirming their opposition to discrimination. While they did not
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. The author wishes to thank
Barry Cushman, Ben Field, Kevin Fox Gotham, Scott Henderson, Beth Hillman, Arnold Hirsch, Seth Kreimer, Anne Kringel, James Kushner, Gideon Parchomovsky,
Wendy Plotkin, Michael Schill, Rich Schragger, and Mark Tushnet for their comments
and encouragement on this article. Jennifer Burns, Greg David, and Katherine Stroker
provided excellent research assistance. This article also benefited from comments received at the conference on “Law and the Disappearance of Class” and the University
of Pennsylvania Law School Faculty Workshop.
1. JACKIE ROBINSON, I NEVER HAD IT MADE 117 (as told to Alfred Duckett) (1972).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Robinson Rouses Home Sale Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1953, at 22.
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intend their actions as a “crusade,” the statement proclaimed that the
“exclusion of any person solely for reasons of race, creed or national
origin could lessen the spiritual, economic and social development of
the community.”5 Some realtors criticized the ministers for “blowing
up the issue,” and “jeopardizing investments,” but most of the leaders
in North Stamford supported the statement.6 Later that same month, the
Robinsons signed an agreement to purchase a house in the area.7
The Robinsons’ struggle was part of an increasing focus on racial
discrimination in the post-World War II years. Social, political, and
economic change in the 1940s resulted in an invigorated civil rights
movement that could no longer be ignored by the country’s political
elite. While progress was slow, legal and political victories, as well as
personal successes like those of the Robinsons’, became increasingly
common in the postwar years. The effort against housing discrimination
is a crucial, yet neglected, aspect of the broader civil rights movement.8
This article brings fair housing activists back into the broader story
of the civil rights struggle during the 1950s. While the legal and political battles over school segregation are well known, little has been
written about the struggles against residential segregation in the 1950s.9
Urban historians and social scientists have documented the efforts of
federal, state, and local officials, as well as white residents, to maintain
segregated neighborhoods in the postwar years, but these works have
given little attention to the political and legal efforts to ban housing
discrimination.10 The story of the civil rights movement is incomplete
without an understanding of the fair housing movement.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id.
Id.
See Robinsons to Buy Home, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1953, at 20.
But see MARTHA BIONDI, TO STAND AND FIGHT: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS IN POSTWAR NEW YORK CITY (2003); STEPHEN GRANT MEYER, AS LONG AS
THEY DON’T MOVE NEXT DOOR: SEGREGATION AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN AMERICAN
NEIGHBORHOODS (2000). For examples of works on the Civil Rights Movement that
ignore the fair housing movement, see TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS:
AMERICAN IN THE KING YEARS 1954–63 (1988); STEVEN F. LAWSON, RUNNING FOR
FREEDOM: CIVIL RIGHTS AND BLACK POLITICS IN AMERICA SINCE 1941 (1991); SEAN
DENNIS CASHMAN, AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE QUEST FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, 1900–
1990 (1991); HARVARD SITKOFF, THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY, 1954–1992
(rev. ed. 1993); MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION THE SECOND
RECONSTRUCTION IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945–1990 (2d ed. 1991).
9. On the school segregation battles, see MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION 1925–1950 (1987); WHAT BROWN
V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS
REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001);
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (Vintage Books 1977) (1976).
10. On the process of segregation in the 1950s, see ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING
THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO, 1940–1960 (1986); THOMAS
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The fair housing movement illuminates many of the contradictions
that have and continue to vex civil rights efforts. In particular, the 1950s
battles reveal the class-based limitations of the fair housing movement
(with implications for other equal opportunity efforts).11 In a society in
which property ownership provided one of the primary means to
achieving middle class status, the use of rights-based strategies was of
limited assistance to persons who lacked the financial means to take
advantage of newly won rights. Fair housing activists saw their struggle
through the lens of upwardly mobile minority Americans and they
sought to secure for this group the full benefits of citizenship. They
succeeded in expanding governmental regulation over housing discrimination, but the institutions they established were incapable of enabling
those without money to participate actively in the housing market.
Fair housing activists argued that they were only seeking to allow
all citizens to enjoy the fruits of home ownership, but those who believed that such laws were an infringement of fundamental property
rights met calls for greater government intervention in the housing market with vocal opposition. In the postwar years, concerns over “property
values” vied with demands for equal treatment, a competition that continues to impede efforts to reverse decades of segregation. At the same
time, the proposals of housing activists for “affirmative action” to create
integrated communities raised, and failed to resolve, the competition
for limited housing resources that resulted in a zero sum game in which
the benefit to some came at the expense of others. All of these conflicts
continue to shape our debates over civil rights laws today.12 In the case
of housing discrimination, as present day critics have noted, the structure of the laws passed provided benefits to the middle and upper
classes, but denied them to the masses. Understanding how fair housing
J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR
DETROIT (1996); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993), WENDELL E. PRITCHETT, BROWNSVILLE, BROOKLYN: BLACKS, JEWS AND THE CHANGING FACE OF THE
GHETTO (2002).
11. On black intellectuals and the conflict between race and class, see JONATHAN
SCOTT HOLLOWAY, CONFRONTING THE VEIL: ABRAM HARRIS, JR., E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, AND RALPH BUNCHE 1919–1941 95–103, 214–15 (2002). On the possibilities
and limitations of equal employment law, see PAUL D. MORENO, FROM DIRECT ACTION
TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: FAIR EMPLOYMENT LAW AND POLICY IN AMERICA, 1933–
1972 (1997).
12. On the class-based nature of affirmative action, see WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON,
THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS AND PUBLIC POLICY
112–18 (1987); STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY
(1991); RACE VS. CLASS: THE NEW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE (Carol Swain ed.,
1996); RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE AND AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION (1996)
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activists struggled with, or failed to comprehend, these issues helps to
frame several current policy debates, including the government’s role
in ameliorating residential segregation and the role of affirmative action
in American society.
This article begins with the Shelley decision and ends with President
John F. Kennedy’s executive order banning discrimination in some
government-funded housing—the formative years of the modern fair
housing movement. Civil rights activists attacked segregation laws and
agreements for decades, and the 1948 Supreme Court opinion, Shelley
v. Kraemer,13 which declared that government enforcement of “restrictive covenants” was unconstitutional, elicited new attention on the issue
of housing discrimination.14 The Shelley decision came at a time of
increasing attention to the problems of blacks in Northern cities as well
as a period of great debate over housing policy in the United States.
With the passage of the Housing Act of 1949, civil rights activists were
particularly concerned that the nation’s housing effort provide shelter
on an equal basis to all Americans, and they decided to organize an
expanded effort to combat the problem of housing discrimination. The
coalitions they created, including the New York State Committee on
Discrimination in Housing and the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, were important institutions that provided models for the emerging civil rights movement.
Shelley was at best a mixed victory for civil rights. While the court
declared it unconstitutional for states to enforce restrictive covenants,
the case also specifically declared that nothing in the Constitution forbade individuals from entering into such agreements.15 Implicit in the
holding was that private parties retained the right to deny housing to
persons on the basis of race. Shelley reinforced other precedents declaring the Constitution a powerless document regarding housing discrimination. These precedents shaped the activists’ strategy.16 The fair
housing movement reveals the multi-faceted nature of civil rights activism in the 1950s. In contrast to the battle against school segregation,
which mainly took place in courtrooms, the fair housing movement
aimed at changing public opinion and lobbying legislatures to ban housing discrimination.
13. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
14. Id.
15. On the history of the Shelley case, see CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY:
THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES (1959).
16. Such would be the case until the 1968 Supreme Court opinion in Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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To build their case, fair housing advocates employed the rhetoric of
property.17 Through conferences, pamphlets, and other efforts, activists
worked to convince the country that denying property rights to minorities was un-American. Property ownership, they claimed, was so crucial to the political economy of the country that its denial amounted to
a denial of full citizenship.18 Advocates argued that it was time that the
country follow the principles established in the Civil Rights Act of
1866, which stated, “All citizens of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens
thereof to inherit, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.”19 Advocates further argued that segregation was wrong, that it
had negative social and economic effects, and that America would be
a truly democratic society when all races lived in one community. In
the postwar era, when blacks, Jews, and other minorities constantly
pointed to the sacrifices they had made for their country, the demand
for equal access to property and the right to full participation was a
powerful argument.
But these claims contradicted the widely accepted principle that
property ownership included the full right of disposal. Implicit in this
right was the “privilege to choose one’s neighbors.”20 In the 1940s,
restrictive covenants were an accepted aspect of housing policy. From
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) down to the local realtor,
the real estate industry held as one of its central tenets that people of
different races should not live together. The ethical code of the National
Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB) stated specifically that
realtors should not introduce into a neighborhood “members of any
race . . . whose presence would clearly be detrimental to property values. . . .”21 From its inception in 1934 until 1949, FHA regulations
strongly approved of restrictive covenants in all federally financed
housing. At the same time, in a period of heightened concern about
communism, conservative political leaders opposed any attempts to
expand the regulatory state. Led by the NAREB, the real estate industry
continued to vigorously battle any proposals they believed would infringe upon the rights of property owners.
17. On the importance of property to American legal culture, see Joan Williams,
The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277 (1998); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000).
20. See ROBINSON, supra note 1.
21. NAT’L ASS’N OF REAL ESTATE BDS., CODE OF ETHICS 3 (1924) (on file with
author).
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In this context, securing anti-discrimination legislation seemed a
daunting task. Fair housing advocates responded that the government’s
“police powers” had been consistently expanded to address modern
problems. Property rights, they argued, were not sacrosanct, but instead
were subject to regulation for the good of society. Led by, among others,
future HUD Secretary Robert Weaver, lawyer and housing activist
Charles Abrams, and future New York Judge Hortense Gabel, the fair
housing movement succeeded in creating new civil rights. In the face
of constant opposition, advocates built fair housing law brick by brick
in the postwar years, beginning with laws preventing discrimination in
public housing and working to expand the scope of fair housing to the
private market. These laws established the limited bureaucratic infrastructure for the regulation of housing discrimination that was the
model for federal legislation in the 1960s.
By the early 1960s, fair housing advocates had made significant progress in winning the ideological debate and the fair housing movement
had achieved numerous successes. During his 1960 campaign, candidate John F. Kennedy stated that he would erase federal housing discrimination “with the stroke of a pen” by signing an executive order if
elected. While Kennedy did not immediately sign an order after his
election, and issued only a limited directive, by the early 1960s those
who maintained that housing discrimination was legally permissible
were on the defensive. States and cities across the country witnessed
grassroots movements against housing discrimination during the 1960s
and these efforts culminated in the passage of the Fair Housing Act in
1968.
Despite the movement’s achievements, housing segregation increased in the 1950s, and blacks and whites lived increasingly apart.
Housing discrimination, while it decreased in some areas, continued to
be the norm in most parts of the country. The failure of the fair housing
movement to achieve the advocates’ goal of an integrated society was
the result of many factors including government intransigence, racism
in the private market, as well as broader social and economic changes
in American society.
In using the dominant discourse of property rights, advocates revealed the class-based nature of the fair housing movement. Fair housing advocates were certainly concerned about shelter for the poor; they
were active in lobbying for increased public housing and other affordable housing programs. Their political arguments focused, however, on
the impropriety of denying an individual the right to buy a house on
the basis of race. Fair housing advocates hoped to open up opportunities
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for middle-class blacks who would lead the way to an integrated society. Jackie Robinson, who broke baseball’s color barrier, moving into
a formerly segregated neighborhood, was a powerful image that was
relied upon frequently by the movement. When whites saw that these
pioneers made positive contributions to their neighborhoods, advocates
claimed that support for anti-discrimination laws would increase and
integration would follow.22 By shaping their strategy in this manner,
advocates narrowed the scope of debate on the responsibility of government to provide meaningful access to housing for all Americans.23
Jackie Robinson could afford to build his dream house. The overwhelming majority of minority Americans (and their white counterparts) could not.
As a practical strategy, the focus on the right to homeownership was
logical. Activists understood the cultural power of homeownership, and
they relied on this discourse in their lobbying efforts.24 But the sanctity
of homeownership to white Americans and to the real estate industry
was extremely strong, as was opposition to government regulation in
what were viewed as private matters. In addition, the creation of the
post-World War II suburbs rested in large part on a racialized understanding of space. New suburban developments would provide safe,
wholesome locations for nurturing white middle-class children. The
dominant understanding of these communities conflicted directly with
the integrationist aspirations of fair housing advocates.25 Fair housing
22. This was, in essence, the “Contact Hypothesis” later explicated by Gordon Allport. GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954); see also John O.
Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1067, 1121–22 (1998). For a critique of the “role model” framework, see Richard
Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want to Be
a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222, 1226–31 (1991).
23. On the tensions over the role of government in providing decent housing, see
GAIL RADFORD, MODERN HOUSING FOR AMERICA: POLICY STRUGGLES IN THE NEW
DEAL ERA (1996).
24. On the importance of homeownership in American society, see Ronald Tobey
et al., Moving Out and Settling In: Residential Mobility, Home Ownership and the
Public Enframing of Citizenship, 1921–1950, 95 AM. HIST. REV. 1395–1421, 1415–
17 (1990); Janet Hutchison, Shaping Housing and Enhancing Consumption: Hoover’s
Interwar Housing Policy, in FROM TENEMENTS TO THE TAYLOR HOMES: IN SEARCH
OF AN URBAN HOUSING POLICY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 81 (John Bauman
et al. eds., 2000).
25. On the racialization of space, see KEVIN FOX GOTHAM, RACE, REAL ESTATE,
AND UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT: THE KANSAS CITY EXPERIENCE, 1900–2000 (2002);
Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1843 (1994); Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 1707 (1993); Regina Austin, “Not Just for the Fun of It!:” Governmental
Restraints on Black Leisure, Social Inequality, and the Privatization of Public Space,
71 S. CAL. L. REV. 667 (1998); Keith Aoki, Race, Space and Place: The Relation
Between Architectural Modernism, Post-Modernism, Urban Planning and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699 (1993); David Freund, Making It Home; Race, De-

406

THE URBAN LAWYER

VOL. 35, NO. 3

SUMMER 2003

advocates, fearing a political backlash, pushed their program in a piecemeal manner, hoping that they could create experiments in integrated
living in newly developed areas that would break down such opposition
by showing that integration worked. As a result of this strategy, while
activists won the ideological battle, the laws they secured only regulated a small number of dwellings.
Even the successes of fair housing activists came at some cost. Their
clearest victory, in prohibiting discrimination within public housing,
was a hollow one, because it perversely contributed to the “ghettoization” of the projects. It was only in the late 1950s that fair housing
activists began to argue that all citizens had a responsibility to participate in the housing market in a nondiscriminatory manner. By the
time they succeeded in these efforts, the postwar pattern of inner cities
with poor minorities and suburbs with middle class whites was well
established.26
Early fair housing laws became models for the expanded movement
in the 1960s and led to the passage of federal Fair Housing Act. The
legislation in New York and in other cities relied on the initiative of
individuals to pursue claims of discrimination, and they established new
institutions to oversee the system. However, these bureaucracies were
limited in scope and struggled to secure adequate funding for the job.
Critics of the Fair Housing Act have argued that the law provides limited protection because poor minorities do not have the means to secure
legal assistance to bring a claim.27 The class-based limitations of the
fair housing strategy were present from its inception.
An analysis of the movement against housing discrimination highlights the contradictions of rights-based ideology as a means for furthering social improvement.28 Fair housing advocates argued that race
velopment and the Politics of Place in Suburban Detroit, 1940–1967 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (on file with author).
26. This article does not make a casual argument between the passage of fair housing
laws and the entrenchment of racial segregation in the postwar years. As this article
argues, the laws passed in the 1950s had only a minor impact.
27. See, e.g., James Kushner, A Comparative Vision of the Convergence of Ecology,
Empowerment and the Quest for a Just Society, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 931, 933 (1998);
John Charles Boger, Toward Ending Residential Segregation: A Fair Share Proposal
for the Next Reconstruction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1573, 1583 (1993); Alex Johnson, Shaping
American Communities: Segregation, Housing and the Urban Poor: How Race and Poverty Intersect to Prevent Integration: Destabilizing Race as a Vehicle to Integrate Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1595, 1600 (1995); Calmore, supra note 22, at 1071.
28. The literature on the limitations of rights-based ideology is voluminous. See,
e.g., Derek Bell, Brown v. Board and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 518 (1980); Mark V. Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REV. 23 (1993).
But see Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1368–
69 (1988) (for a defense of the use of rights rhetoric).
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should be removed from the consideration of housing opportunities:
that all persons should have equal access. At the same time, activists
sought to achieve an integrated society. Advocates thought that these
goals were complementary, but even as discrimination seemed to subside, segregation remained the norm. A decade before the efficacy of
“affirmative action” would enter the public debate, the fair housing
effort raised these important questions. In the only area where government did take affirmative steps to promote integration, the class-based
nature of the movement was exposed in particularly stark relief. In
response to concerns that their once integrated public housing projects
were becoming increasingly minority, some fair housing advocates argued for racial quotas in these developments. Because of the limited
number of units available, New York City’s short-lived attempt to stem
the ghettoization of its public housing resulted in a decrease in access
to housing for poor minorities.
This study of the fair housing movement contributes to our understanding of the limitations of civil rights laws to affect social change.
Critics of fair housing laws argue that they did not achieve the goal of
an integrated society, but these analyses fail to understand the multitude
of economic, social, and political forces that shaped the options of fair
housing activists during the 1950s. As this history reveals, fair housing
laws were, in principal, successful in securing the limited goals of opening up new resources for middle-class blacks that advocates hoped to
achieve. Only a more nuanced understanding of the history of the fair
housing movement can provide the appropriate context for assessing
the successes and limitations of fair housing laws. The problem of
housing segregation lies not primarily in the passage of specific laws,
but in the broader structures of American society.29
The question of the appropriate role of government in race relations
continues to draw a great deal of attention in the early twenty-first
century. Arguments over the efficacy, fairness, and legality of “affirmative action” programs are a central part of this unresolved debate.30
The fair housing movement illuminates several conflicts in this struggle. While banning discrimination was a partial answer to the problems
of residential segregation, the American system of private property and
29. Several fair housing scholars have reached the same conclusion in the last few
years, see Kushner, supra note 27, at 933; Boger, supra note 27, at 1583.
30. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION, RACE AND AMERICAN VALUES (1996); JOHN SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, CULTURE AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA (1996); RACE
VS. CLASS, supra note 12; LANIE GUINIER & SUSAN STURM, WHO’S QUALIFIED?
(2002).
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local government privileged and continues to privilege the interests of
current property owners over prospective ones. The law had limited
ability to alter this imbalance of power.31 In a market of limited housing
resources, minority home-seekers faced a daunting task in finding new
housing. At the same time, the intensified government involvement in
the housing market required to create integrated communities conflicted
with the individual rights of citizens, including the minorities the programs sought to help.32 The class implications of affirmative action
programs were present, and unresolved, in the formative years of the
fair housing movement. They remain so today.
Section I of this article discusses the formation of the fair housing
movement in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and examines the political
and social philosophies of the movement’s leaders. Section II assesses
the interaction of fair housing advocates and government agencies in the
brief window of opportunity following the Shelley decision and describes
the obstacles they faced in creating a national program against discrimination. Section III analyzes the crusade to pass fair housing legislation
in New York City and State, the first locales to consider such laws. These
battles illuminate the differing conceptions of property rights and the role
of government held by both sides of the debate and assesses the fundamental limitations of their proposals. Section IV then describes the
emerging national effort for fair housing and discusses how the vision
of fair housing advocates was replicated. Section V examines the debate
over housing quotas in late 1950s New York, a conflict that revealed
the inherent contradictions in the goals of equal opportunity and antidiscrimination. The Conclusion offers a brief analysis of the fair housing movement in the 1960s (a topic worthy of its own study), assesses
the impact of fair housing laws in the last thirty years, and examines
the implications of this study to modern civil rights efforts.
II. Creating a Fair Housing Movement

The Shelley decision remains one of the most important opinions in the
field of housing discrimination and is an important victory in the struggle for civil rights. However, another opinion released less than a year
later had as much influence on the fair housing movement. In April of
1949, in a case with far reaching implications for postwar urban
31. On the limited power of affirmative action, see Derrick Bell, Bakke, Minority
Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67 CAL. L. REV. 3, 17 (1979).
32. On the conflicting principles of affirmative action, see LINCOLN CAPLAN, UP
AGAINST THE LAW: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE SUPREME COURT 2 (1997).
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housing, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that the state and federal
constitutions were powerless to prevent housing corporations from discriminating on the basis of race.33 The defeat for equal rights was a
crucial part of a decade-long struggle to integrate the Stuyvesant Town
Development, the nation’s first urban renewal project.
The battle over equal rights at Stuyvesant Town brought together
many advocates who would organize a broader movement for reform.34
This effort was shaped by a group of activists who saw housing discrimination as the major obstacle to the incorporation of AfricanAmericans and other minorities into American society. They believed
the opening up of new opportunities to middle-class blacks would provide the stepping point for broader integration efforts. From the beginning, however, activists battled against deep-seated conceptions of private property rights.
Stuyvesant Town was the first project built under New York’s Urban
Redevelopment Corporation’s Law. Spearheaded by master builder and
“power broker” Robert Moses, and sponsored by the Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company, the middle-income apartment complex covered a
seventy-two acre tract of land on Manhattan’s Lower East Side.35 While
most of the city’s progressive leadership supported the idea of urban
renewal, the city attacked Stuyvesant Town on many grounds. Critics
complained that the project would uproot thousands without adequate
provision for their shelter and would create an overly dense, “walled
off community in the middle of the city.”36 But civil rights activists
were most concerned about the remarks of Met Life Chair, Frederick
Ecker, regarding Stuyvesant Town’s racial composition. “Negroes and
whites don’t mix,” Ecker stated, and he declared that the project would
be for whites only.37
This statement started a flurry of activity at the city and state level.
Civil rights activists demanded that the city and state refuse to move
forward on the project until Ecker agreed that it would admit tenants
on a nondiscriminatory basis. Unable to achieve success in the legislature, activists brought suit against Metropolitan Life and the city. The
lead counsel on the case was Charles Abrams. Born in Russia, Abrams
33. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512 (1949).
34. The story of the battle over Stuyvesant Town is ably told in SCOTT HENDERSON,
HOUSING AND THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL: THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF CHARLES
ABRAMS 122–45 (2000); JOEL SCHWARTZ, THE NEW YORK APPROACH: ROBERT MOSES, URBAN LIBERALS THE REDEVELOPMENT OF THE INNER CITY 84–107 (1993).
35. HENDERSON, supra note 34, at 127–29; SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, at 84.
36. HENDERSON, supra note 34, at 127–28.
37. HENDERSON, supra note 34, at 122.
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immigrated to New York as a child. Like many other working-class
Brooklyn Jews, Abrams attended City College. He then became a successful real estate lawyer in Manhattan and an active supporter of housing reform.38 Abrams played a crucial role in the creation of the New
York City Housing Authority and served as its counsel for the first four
years of its existence. He was a prolific writer and speaker on issues of
housing and he was a vocal critic of what he termed the “Business
Welfare State.” Abrams believed that urban redevelopment should be
controlled by public agencies, but during the 1940s he saw the laws he
had helped craft usurped by private corporations for their own gain.39
Ecker’s announcement that Stuyvesant Town was to be segregated
was further evidence of Abrams claim. “We are faced with the dilemma,” Abrams stated, “that the very social reforms in housing and
city planning—zoning, slum clearance and so on—which are thought
to advance social progress lend themselves most easily to devices for
achieving discrimination.”40 Abrams argued that instead of intensifying
segregation, Stuyvesant Town could be a model for future integration
efforts. Because it would be a new development, the residents would
not have established views about what was acceptable for the neighborhood. Abrams pointed out that New York’s public housing had been
successful in achieving integration, and that Stuyvesant Town could be
a further “proving ground that different racial groups could live in
harmony.”41
Despite his active role in the movement, Abrams remained skeptical
about the power of the law to eliminate housing discrimination. Abrams
argued that the intensity of prejudice was too high among most whites,
and that efforts at legislative action would generally fail, unless they
were focused specifically on housing produced with direct government
involvement.42 Abrams frequently criticized activists who called for
anti-discrimination laws in areas where they had not initiated grassroots
organizing, and he worried that such efforts would impede the efforts
38. Abrams’s 1955 book, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS, became the bible of the fair housing movement. In the 1940s and 1950s, he wrote dozens of articles on the subject.
39. See HENDERSON, supra note 34, at 129–35; CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN
NEIGHBORS (1955) [hereinafter ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS].
40. HENDERSON, supra note 34, at 134 (quoting Charles Abrams, The Segregation
Threat in Housing, COMMENTARY 123–31 (Feb. 1949)).
41. HENDERSON, supra note 34, at 132.
42. Algernon Black, Report on Conference with Charles Abrams (Apr. 6, 1949)
(Black Papers, Box 9) (on file with author); Charles Abrams, “The Limits of Law in
Housing and Social Action,” Speech Delivered at the 12th Annual Institute on Race
Relations, June 29, 1955, NAACP Papers, Part 5, Roll 10 (on file with author).
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to secure more affordable housing that would have an immediate impact
on blacks and other minorities.43
The Dorsey case was a joint effort of many groups, including the
NAACP, the City-Wide Citizens Committee for Harlem, the American
Civil Liberties Union, and the American Jewish Congress.44 Among the
leaders of the struggle was Algernon Black. Black was a graduate of
Columbia College and the director of the New York Ethical Culture
Society. Black took a humanistic approach to the question of discrimination and frequently spoke about the moral requirement that all persons be treated equally.45 His office was a clearinghouse for many activist causes, and he was particularly crucial to the effort to secure
financial resources for the fair housing movement.46
The plaintiffs, led by Joseph R. Dorsey, Monroe Dowling, and Calvin
Harper, three African-American veterans, applied for an injunction requiring that Stuyvesant Town consider their applications.47 In court,
Metropolitan Life argued that it was free to select its tenants like any
private landlord. Abrams countered that Stuyvesant Town was not a
“private” development, but rather a public/private effort. Because the
government was crucial to the project—the city provided tax abatements and utilized its powers of eminent domain to assist the development—Stuyvesant Town was in essence a “public undertaking” and
required under the state and federal constitutions to provide equal access.48 The trial court denied the plaintiff ’s request, and the appellate
division affirmed the decision.49 On appeal to the court of appeals,
Thurgood Marshall, director of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,
joined Abrams on the brief. Fresh off the victory in the Shelley case,
the NAACP viewed the Stuyvesant Town dispute as crucial to the cause
of fair housing. Joseph Robison, Will Maslow, and Stephen Polier of
the Committee for Law and Social Action of the American Jewish
Congress, also participated in the appellant’s case.50
In a four-to-three decision, the court of appeals denied the appellant’s
43. FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS, supra note 39, at 385.
44. Amicus briefs were filed by numerous organizations, including the Citizens
Housing and Planning Council, the National Lawyers Guild, and the Friendship House
of Harlem. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512 (1949).
45. Among Black’s many publications were WHO’S MY NEIGHBOR? (1958); IF I
MARRY OUTSIDE MY RELIGION (1954); and PEOPLE AND THE POLICE (1968).
46. Columbia University has in its special collections a collection of Black’s papers,
which reveal his involvement with numerous endeavors.
47. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 190 Misc. 187 (N.Y. 1947).
48. Id. at 191.
49. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 274 N.Y. App. Div. 992 (N.Y. App. Div.
1948).
50. Id.
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petition. Writing for the majority, Justice Bromley cited the repeated
attempts to amend the New York State Constitution with regard to
housing discrimination, and concluded that the legislature had declined
to require redevelopment corporations to provide housing on a nondiscriminatory basis.51 “No statute in New York recognizes the opportunity
to acquire interests in property as a civil right,” the court stated.52 The
court distinguished recent precedents, including Shelley and Marsh v.
Alabama,53 holding that those cases “disclose the exertion of governmental power directly to aid in discrimination.”54 “Neither fact is present here,” the court concluded.55 The participation of the government
in the Stuyvesant Town development was not significant enough to
constitute state action under the Constitution.
The Dorsey battle brought together several organizations to create a
permanent organization to fight housing discrimination. In 1949, they
formed the New York State Committee Against Discrimination in Housing (NYSCDH), with Algernon Black as chair.56 The executive director
of the organization was Hortense Gabel, who had formerly been assistant
corporation counsel for the City of New York. Born in the Bronx, Gabel
would have a long history of opening doors for women in the legal field.
Among the first women to graduate from Columbia Law School, she
would later become a judge on the New York Supreme Court. Journalist
Robert Caro described Gabel as a “reformer with a healthy helping of
the reformer’s penchant for idealism.”57 Gabel was drawn to the fair
housing effort through her friendship with Rabbi Stephen Wise, founder
of the American Jewish Congress.58 Gabel was active in many civil rights
causes throughout the 1940s, and afterwards she served as the organization’s primary paid staff person.59
The primary purpose of the NYSCDH was to secure local and state
legislation banning discrimination in housing.60 In a resolution adopted
51. See Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 528–29 (1949).
52. Id. at 531.
53. 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment covered a corporate town).
54. Dorsey, 299 N.Y. at 533.
55. Id. at 533–34.
56. See JULIET SALTMAN, OPEN HOUSING: DYNAMICS OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT 44–
45 (1978).
57. ROBERT CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW
YORK 961 (1974).
58. Id. at 961.
59. Paula Span, The Bitter Limbo of Bess Myerson: The Commissioner and a Prominent N.Y. Judge Toppled by Scandal, WASH. POST, July 23, 1987, at C1.
60. The Work of the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing and
the New York State Committee on Discrimination in Housing, Algernon Black Papers,
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December 2, 1949, the delegates stated that “residential segregation is
bad planning. It is inconsistent with the tenets of our democratic society.”61 They called on the New York State Legislature to “take
effective action to prevent racial and religious discrimination and
segregation in all housing constructed in this state with public
assistance.”62
The NYSCDH drew its strength from the coalition of groups that
supported fair housing. Most active among its constituent members
were the NAACP and the American Jewish Congress.63 Both organizations provided staff resources and legal assistance to the organization.
The board of directors of the group was filled with leaders of New
York’s liberal elite, including Judge Justine Wise Polier, Stephen Polier,
Dr. Bryn Hovde, president of the New School for Social Research, New
York City Councilman Stanley Isaacs, Judge Hubert Delany, and Mrs.
Marshall Field.64
Among the organization’s many activities was the publication of
several pamphlets advocating fair housing, research on housing discrimination in cities across New York State, and organization of conferences on the topic. The keynote speaker at the group’s first conference was Robert Clifton Weaver. Born in Washington D.C., Weaver
was a member of that city’s black elite. His grandfather had been the
first African-American to graduate from Harvard Dental School.
Weaver followed family tradition and attended Harvard himself, receiving his Ph.D. in Economics from the University in 1934. A protégé
of W.E.B. DuBois, Weaver held numerous positions in Roosevelt’s
New Deal government. He served as advisor on Negro Affairs to InColumbia University Special Collections, Box 9 (on file with author) [hereinafter
“Black Papers”].
61. Id.
62. Resolution on Publicly Assisted Housing (Dec. 2, 1949), Papers of the United
Neighborhood Houses, Social Welfare Archives, University of Minnesota, Box 42,
Folder 429 (on file with author) [hereinafter “UNH Papers”].
63. The group’s “Cooperating Organizations” were: American Association of University Women, The American Civil Liberties Union, the American Jewish Committee,
the American Jewish Congress, the American Veterans Committee, the AntiDefamation League of B’nai B’rith, the Board of Home Missions, Congregational
Christian Churches, the Citizens Housing and Planning Council of New York, the
Commission on Christian Social Relations of the Episcopal Diocese of New York, the
Human Relations Commission of the Protestant Council of New York, the Intergroup
Relations Committee-New York Ethical Society, the Jewish Labor Committee, the
Jewish War Veterans, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
the National Conference of Christians and Jews, the United Neighborhood Houses of
New York, and the Women’s City Club of New York.
64. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS (1949).
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terior Secretary Harold Ickes, helped establish the Race Relations Service at the United States Housing Agency, and served as a staff member
of the War Production Board. During these years, Weaver published
dozens of articles and two books on housing and labor policy.65
In 1948, Weaver published The Negro Ghetto, a study of racial
change in Northern cities that quickly became required reading for students of urban policy. The Negro Ghetto was a history, sociology, and
economic analysis of the black ghetto. It was also a vigorous critique
of the system of restrictive covenants and of the government’s role in
supporting segregation.66 NAACP lawyers relied heavily on Weaver’s
work in their brief in the Shelley case.67 By the late 1940s, Weaver was
widely acknowledged to be among the foremost authorities on housing
discrimination, and he became the leading intellectual force behind the
fair housing movement.
In The Negro Ghetto, Weaver declared that urban renewal could be
an “[o]pportunity or threat” depending upon how it was implemented.68
Weaver argued that only “sound city planning,” without segregation,
would enable urban redevelopment to succeed.69 He worried that urban
renewal carried “a triple threat to minorities and good housing,” because it might displace blacks from desirable areas, be used to break
up integrated neighborhoods, and result in a decrease in housing.70 Appropriately implemented, however, urban redevelopment could also be,
Weaver argued, a chance to create new patterns of living for blacks.71
Like Abrams, Weaver felt that new communities presented the best
opportunity for experimentation in integration.72
Influenced by his concern about the impact of the program, housing
advocates decided at the 1949 conference that it was necessary to establish an organization to focus on the national problem of housing
65. Robert Weaver, Whither Northern Race Relations Committees?, 5 PHYLON 205–
18 (1944) [hereinafter Weaver, Whither Northern Race Relations Committees]; Robert
Weaver, Planning for a More Flexible Land Use, 23 J. LAND & PUB. UTIL. ECON. 29–
41 (1947); Robert Weaver, Habitation with Segregation, OPPORTUNITY ( June 1952)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Weaver, Habitation with Segregation]; Robert
Weaver, The Effect of Anti-Discrimination Legislation upon the FHA and VA-Insured
Housing Market in New York State, 31 LAND ECON. 303–13 (1955); Robert Weaver,
Non-White Population Movements and Urban Ghettos, 20 PHYLON 235–41 (1959);
ROBERT WEAVER, NEGRO LABOR: THE PROBLEM OF TODAY (1946); ROBERT WEAVER,
THE NEGRO GHETTO (1948) [hereinafter WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO].
66. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO, supra note 65.
67. CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY (Univ. of Cal. Press 1967) (1959).
68. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO, supra note 65, at 322.
69. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO, supra note 65, at 275.
70. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO, supra note 65, at 324.
71. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO, supra note 65, at 328.
72. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO, supra note 65, at 328.
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discrimination.73 The conferees voted to create the National Committee
Against Discrimination in Housing (NCDH), and elected Weaver president. Algernon Black was elected chair of the Board of Directors.74
Delegates decided that the organization would share offices and staff
with the NYSCDH.75
The stated purpose of the NCDH was to conduct research on the
housing situation of minorities in cities across the country, and to work
with grassroots groups interested in achieving equal access in housing.
However, the NCDH quickly became involved in advocacy for fair
housing efforts. During the group’s first decade, NCDH leaders undertook numerous campaigns, particularly at the federal level, to secure
equal access to housing for all individuals.76 The committee’s publications sought to influence public opinion to support legislation against
discrimination. “One fact is starkly clear: Discrimination in housing is
the keystone of all forms of discrimination,” stated one such pamphlet.77
While the NCDH was a coalition of many groups with strong ideas
about civil rights, Weaver’s perspective on these issues was very influential. Weaver had written frequently about the unfairness of the exclusion blacks, particularly higher-income blacks, experienced in the
housing market. “No less ironic is the fact that when, at long last, an
appreciable number of colored Americans have sufficient incomes to
afford decent housing, those who want to better their home surroundings are forced to pay through the nose.”78 Throughout the late 1940s
and 1950s, Weaver argued that there was a growing number of black
families able to pay for suburban housing, and that builders and policymakers were wrongly preventing them from participating. “Under a
73. Black Papers, supra note 60.
74. Minutes of Meeting of the Temporary Committee to Form a National Committee
Against Discrimination in Housing, Held at the Fieldston School ( July 26, 1950)
(NAACP Papers, Part V Housing, Roll 17) (on file with author).
75. See Black Papers, supra note 60, at Box 12; see also MEYER, supra note 8,
at 139.
76. Gabel and Weaver had originally conceived of an organization they called
“Housing Research Council, Inc.” to conduct studies and provide information on the
housing status of minorities. They applied for funding for this organization, but they
were rebuffed by several foundations who felt that the research would not be “objective.” The organizers of the committee then shifted the focus of the organization to
encompass advocacy. Letter from Stanley Isaacs to Hortense Gabel, NCDH Papers,
Amisted Research Center, New Orleans (Oct. 10, 1950) (on file with author) [hereinafter NCDH Papers]; Letter from Frank Horne to Robert Weaver (Oct. 23, 1950)
(NCDH Papers); Letter from Hortense Gabel to Ruth Sand (Oct. 30, 1950) (NCDH
Papers); Letter from Hortense Gabel to Will Maslow (Dec. 22, 1950) (NCDH Papers).
77. NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, OPENING A
NEW FRONTIER (1954).
78. Weaver, Habitation with Segregation, supra note 65.
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free economy,” he asserted, “the purchaser is supposed to have access
to the total supply (within his price range) at the same time that the
seller is supposed to have access to the total effective demand.”79 In
his economic analysis, the housing market failed to meet this standard.
“Nowhere is the repudiation of the promise of a free, private enterprise
economy better illustrated than in the development of postwar communities like Levittowns and Park Forest, where colored families
regardless of income and cultural attainments, are systematically
excluded.”80
Weaver was a vocal advocate for public housing throughout his career, and the public housing program witnessed its largest expansion
when he was Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. But when
making the case for fair housing, Weaver consistently focused on higher
income minorities.81 Class segregation, Weaver argued, was a natural
occurrence.82 Immigrants historically had lived in segregated neighborhoods, but they had moved upon achieving economic success. This
process “offered a natural, American escape from blighted areas for
those who have gone ahead, and more important, it has thrown together
persons of immigrant stock with older Americans of the same economic
and cultural development. The result has been a new appreciation for
the individual and less concern about national origin or background.”83
Unfortunately, Weaver argued, blacks had been excluded from this process. “Those of his group who have cultural and economic ties with
present residents in desirable areas seldom get a chance to move into
these areas. The deterioration of sections where Negroes live becomes,
in the popular mind, a reflection of racial characteristics rather than the
result of low economic status of occupants.”84
To overcome the fears of white homeowners that blacks would depress property values, Weaver championed residential restrictions based
not on race but on occupancy and maintenance requirements.85 Property
owners would agree that their homes would be used only for single79. Robert C. Weaver, Address at the Luncheon Meeting of the Sixth Annual Conference on Discrimination in Housing (May 21, 1954) (available in the Robert Weaver
Papers, Supplement, Schomburg Library) (on file with author) [hereinafter Weaver
Papers Supplement].
80. Id.
81. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO, supra note 65, at 269.
82. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO, supra note 65, at 347.
83. Weaver, Whither Northern Race Relations Committees, supra note 65, at 209.
84. Weaver, Whither Northern Race Relations Committees, supra note 65, at 210.
85. See AMERICAN COUNCIL OF RACE RELATIONS, HEMMED IN (1945); Robert
Weaver, Housing in a Democracy, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 95–105
(Mar. 1946) (on file with author); Robert Weaver, A Tool For Democratic Housing,
CRISIS 47–48 (Feb. 1947) (on file with author).
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family residence, and they would meet community standards for care.86
Weaver argued that if residents entered into such agreements, they
would protect themselves against a decline in property values.87 “This
would protect the integrity of the neighborhood and afford an opportunity for the member of a minority group who has the means and the
urge to live in a desirable neighborhood,” and would “prevent, or at
least lessen the exodus of all whites upon the entrance of a few Negroes,
as this is what depresses property values,” Weaver claimed.88 Such
agreements would, Weaver argued, “offer more real protections to owners than undemocratic restrictions based on race,” while at the same
time provide “a basis for real understanding and cooperation between
white and colored residents.”89
In advocating such standards, Weaver hoped to prove that race was
not a factor in neighborhood success. The “talented tenth” would lead
the way in opening doors for other blacks.90 Weaver acknowledged
that he was advocating distinctions based on class but, he argued,
“neither occupancy standards nor any other device could introduce
class in housing. It has been there for centuries.”91 Economically diverse communities, Weaver claimed, were almost always areas in transition from wealthy neighborhoods to poor ones.92 “Truly democratic
neighborhoods—areas where many economic and all racial groups
can find shelter,” he argued, “will be realized in our cities only when
we plan and develop” them.93
Weaver’s goal was to establish a structure to promote racial integration along with modern housing. In The Negro Ghetto, he supported
several progressive programs to increase the production of affordable
housing, including public housing, limited dividend housing, and the
creation of new towns.94 Weaver and other housing activists understood
that the creation of racially and economically integrated communities
required not only government regulation of housing discrimination, but
greater support for the production of affordable housing and increased
86. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO, supra note 65, at 344–45.
87. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO, supra note 65, at 344–45.
88. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF RACE RELATIONS, HEMMED IN 11–12 (1945).
89. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO, supra note 65, at 345.
90. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO, supra note 65, at 366. The “talented tenth” was
a term coined by W.E.B. DuBois, Weaver’s mentor, to describe the group of AfricanAmericans who would lead the way to an integrated society. See DAVID LEVERING
LEWIS, W.E.B. DUBOIS: BIOGRAPHY OF A RACE, 1868–1919 206 (1993).
91. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO, supra note 65, at 347.
92. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO, supra note 65, at 348.
93. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO, supra note 65, at 349.
94. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO, supra note 65, at 307–321.
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government oversight of planning and development. As an analysis of
the debates between housing activists and federal officials reveals, the
social, political, and economic obstacles to these goals were immense.
As a result, fair housing activists were forced to choose among their
demands, and to limit their expectations to promoting experimental
efforts at integration.
III. Closing the Window of Opportunity: Housing
Policy After the Shelley Decision

President Truman created the Housing and Home Finance Agency
(HHFA) in 1947 to oversee the overhaul of the federal housing program. While the HHFA was new in the postwar era, its approach to
issues of housing discrimination was not. With a few exceptions, federal agencies had consistently promoted segregation in their policies.
As several scholars have argued, the postwar suburban ideal was a
racialized space in which the white middle-class would live out their
dreams.95 Housing officials had great difficulty imagining a different
kind of community, and they were extremely concerned about federal
intervention into what they viewed as local matters. In the aftermath
of Shelley, fair housing advocates believed that a window of opportunity had opened to push federal housing administrators toward equal
treatment. While small changes did occur in the years after Shelley, for
the most part federal officials continued to sanction and support housing
discrimination in suburban housing, public housing, and the urban renewal program. The decisions made by federal housing officials in
these years exacerbated the racial segregation and placed additional
obstacles to the fair housing laws later enacted.96
The Supreme Court’s rejection of government enforcement of restrictive covenants created intense concern for many American builders
and their supporters at the HHFA. Administrator Raymond Foley immediately asked for a review of agency policies to see if they would
have to be changed in light of the decision. The conclusion of his staff
was that the HHFA could continue operating business as usual. FHA
Commissioner Franklin Richards stated that the decisions would “in no
way affect the programs of this agency.”97
95. GOTHAM, supra note 25, at 27; Harris, supra note 25, at 1718; Ford, supra note
25, at 1947.
96. This section relies in part on the work of Arnold Hirsch, Choosing Segregation:
Federal Housing Policy Between Shelley and Brown, in FROM TENEMENTS TO THE
TAYLOR HOMES: IN SEARCH OF AN URBAN HOUSING POLICY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 211–14 (John Bauman et al. eds., 2000).
97. Memorandum from Franklin Richards, Commissioner, Federal Housing Admin-
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Truman and his advisors, however, recognized the importance of the
black vote to the Democratic Party and after more than a year of lobbying, the Truman Administration issued an opinion on the applicability of Shelley to federal housing policy.98 In December of 1949, Solicitor
General Philip Perlman announced that the FHA would not provide
mortgage insurance for any properties that had recorded restrictive covenants subsequent to the promulgation of the rule. While real estate
executives blasted the announcement, housing officials quickly calmed
them by noting that the prohibition applied only to recorded restrictive
covenants (not to “gentleman’s agreements”), and stated it would be
“an exceptional case where a property cannot receive Federal mortgage
help.”99 Fair housing advocates were truly disappointed by the order.
NCDH board member Stephen Polier noted, “the new rules will not affect existing restrictive covenants.100 They will not reduce FHA hostility
to mixed housing developments. . . . Most important, the new restrictions
will not prevent FHA from insuring mortgages for builders who openly
announce their intention to exclude minority groups, so long as their intention is not written into a recorded restrictive covenant.”101
Housing activists also failed to secure support from the legislative
branch of the federal government. At the same time that the executive
branch was debating anti-discrimination principles, Congress was considering the Housing Act of 1949, the most significant housing bill in
history.102 While civil rights activists had constantly pressed for antidiscrimination provisions in important legislation, conservative opponents of the act tried to use the principle of equality to stop the passage
of the housing act. In March 1949, Senators John Bricker of Ohio and
Harry Cain of Washington introduced an amendment to the TaftEllender-Wagner bill forbidding racial discrimination in any public
istration, to Raymond Foley, Administrator, Housing Home Finance Administration
(May 21, 1948); see also Hirsch, supra note 96, at 211.
98. On the importance of the black vote to Truman’s civil rights policy, see LAWSON, supra note 9, at 35–39; CASHMAN, supra note 8, at 103–04; DONALD MCCOY &
RICHARD RUETTEN, QUEST AND RESPONSE: MINORITY RIGHTS AND THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION 214–15 (1973).
99. Realty Men Fear Havoc in Building Over Curb on Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
1949, at 1; see also No Change Viewed in Work of F.H.A., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1949,
at 84.
100. Shad Polier, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1949, at 32.
101. Id.
102. For an examination of the history of the Act, see RICHARD O. DAVIES, HOUSING
REFORM DURING THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION (1966); MARK GELFAND, A NATION
OF CITIES: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN AMERICA, 1933–1965 (1975);
GAIL RADFORD, MODERN HOUSING FOR AMERICA: POLICY STRUGGLES IN THE NEW
DEAL ERA (1996); JON TEAFORD, ROUGH ROAD TO RENAISSANCE: URBAN REVITALIZATION IN AMERICA, 1940–1985 (1990).
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housing funded by the bill.103 Bricker and Cain violently opposed most
New Deal-Era reforms, and fought public housing, which Bricker
called “communistic.”104 By introducing race into the debate, they
hoped to divide the coalition of Northern Liberal and Southern Progressives who supported the act.105
The NAACP worked actively to secure passage of the amendment,
but many other liberals were caught between competing causes. Senators Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota and Paul Douglas of Illinois, both
vocal advocates for civil rights, announced their opposition to the fair
housing rider. Douglas declared it would be the “death knell” of urban
redevelopment.106 The Senate liberals argued that the amendment
would imperil the cause of decent housing, which they argued, was
more important.107 Charles Abrams also opposed the amendment. Public housing, Abrams argued, had “done more to point the way to real
non-segregation than any other measure in our time.”108 Abrams
claimed that the program would never survive with the amendment,
and that no public housing would be built in the South, the home of
most African-Americans. He later stated that he worried that “such a
rider” would “play directly into the hands of the real estate lobby and
make the civil rights fight the tool of reaction instead of the bannerhead
of liberalism.”109 The newly established NYSCDH did not take a public
position on the amendment. With limited resources to produce affordable housing, activists were forced to sacrifice the goal of integration.
In view of the lack of support for equal treatment, the NAACP’s main
lobbyist, Clarence Mitchell, concluded, “some liberals simply do not
have the guts to make a good fight for this just principle.”110 The Bricker
Amendment failed, and the Housing Act of 1949 passed.111
There are many ironies to the debates over segregation within public
housing. By the time of the Bricker Amendment, public housing had
become identified as minority housing in many large urban areas.112
103. See DAVIES, supra note 102, at 107; HENDERSON, supra note 34, at 53–155.
104. See RICHARD O. DAVIES, DEFENDER OF THE OLD GUARD: JOHN BRICKER AND
AMERICAN POLITICS (1997).
105. See DAVIES, supra note 102, at 107; Hirsch, supra note 96, at 215.
106. See DAVIES, supra note 102, at 108.
107. See id. at 108; HENDERSON, supra note 34, at 154; Hirsch, supra note 96,
at 215.
108. HENDERSON, supra note 34, at 154.
109. Charles Abrams, Speech Delivered at the 12th Annual Institute of Race Relations, Fisk University ( June 29, 1955) (transcript available NAACP Papers: Part 5,
Housing, Roll 10) (on file with author).
110. HENDERSON, supra note 35, at 154 (quoting Letter to Charles Abrams from
Clarence Mitchell, July 28, 1955, NAACP, Washington Bureau Papers, Box 91, available at the Library of Congress.)
111. Democrats Reject Housing Anti-Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1949, at 1.
112. See THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POST WAR DETROIT (1996).
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While fair housing activists hoped to use public housing to promote
integration, many communities opposed public housing development,
and the program was restricted to minority or transitional areas in most
big cities. In the 1950s, public projects became the first successes for
the fair housing movement when several states passed laws prohibiting
discrimination. By this time, however, public housing had become predominantly minority.113
While the inclusion of anti-discrimination language in the bill would
have made the federal government’s intent clear, the relationship of
suburban development and urban revitalization to racial integration was
undetermined at mid-century. Fair housing advocates believed that public awareness was key to the successful implementation of the housing
act.114 To that end, they organized a public relations committee, which
undertook a major campaign to convince the public that housing discrimination was bad policy.115 The centerpiece of the campaign was the
pamphlet Forbidden Neighbors. Released in November of 1949, immediately after the passage of the Housing Act, the pamphlet argued
that “[t]hese vast funds, which will be greatly enlarged by local expenditures, will have an enormous impact on interracial and group relations. Properly administered, the new law may serve as a major step in
breaking down urban patterns of segregation.”116
Forbidden Neighbors argued that “housing is the crux of the fight
against group hatred,” and that segregation was a moral and social
problem requiring solution.117 Segregation was the cause of group hostilities, it resulted in social problems like crime and delinquency, and
it was responsible for increased government expenditures.118 “More serious than the cash loss is the waste of human beings,” the pamphlet
continued.119 The authors pointed out that discrimination affected our
relations with other countries.120 “In foreign countries our system of
113. LEONARD FRIEDMAN, PUBLIC HOUSING AND THE POLITICS OF POVERTY 140
(1969).
114. Memorandum from Hortense Gabel, Report on Meeting of Advisory Committee
on Urban Redevelopment Conference, Sept. 12, 1949, UNH Papers, Box 42, Folder 429.
115. Report on Meeting of Public Relations Committee (Apr. 22, 1949) (Black
Papers, Box 9) (on file with author).
116. Press Release, New York State Committee on Discrimination in Housing (Nov.
1, 1949) (UNH Papers, Box 42, Folder 425) (on file with author).
117. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, supra
note 64, at 1.
118. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, supra
note 64, at 1.
119. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, supra
note 64, at 6.
120. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, supra
note 64, at 1.
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segregation has been more thoroughly publicized than our preachments
on democracy and the equality of man.”121 Discrimination was a blot
on the country’s reputation. Pointing to examples in public housing,
the pamphlet argued that “racial integration works.”122 The pamphlet
was full of pictures of smiling children playing at these projects. If
these efforts were continued, Forbidden Neighbors argued, integration
could become the norm, not the exception.123 Towards that end, the
pamphlet called upon citizens to take it upon themselves to make integration a reality.124 Forbidden Neighbors argued that equality “begins
at home,” but that active organization was necessary to see that integration became a reality.125 By 1950, the group reported that it had
distributed more than 300,000 copies.126
Since the federal anti-discrimination rider had failed, fair housing
activists focused on the states, and once again, the anti-discrimination
cause was supported by the political competition for the black vote.127
In New York, both Republicans and Democrats vied to gain the mantle
of champion of civil rights.128 In 1951, two years after they had first
proposed the bill, the New York State Legislature passed by unanimous
vote the “Wicks-Austin” bill, prohibiting discrimination in housing
built under the state’s redevelopment act.129 The measure did not cover
VA or FHA housing, and had weak enforcement provisions. It allowed
aggrieved persons to sue, which Algernon Black acknowledged was
unlikely to happen frequently, because plaintiffs would be unable to
afford a lawyer. All the same, activists celebrated the bill as “An Example for the Nation,” and noted that New Jersey had passed a similar
law just a month later.130 That same year the New York City Council
121. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, supra
note 64, at 7.
122. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, supra
note 64, at 7.
123. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, supra
note 64, at 12.
124. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, supra
note 64, at 12.
125. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, supra
note 64, at 12.
126. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, supra
note 64, at 12.
127. On the role of race in New York politics, see BIONDI, supra note 8.
128. Joseph Robison, Fair Housing Legislation in the City and State of New York,
in THE POLITICS OF FAIR-HOUSING LEGISLATION: STATE AND LOCAL CASE STUDIES
41–43 (Lynn W. Eley & Thomas W. Casstevens eds., 1968); BIONDI, supra note 8,
at 194.
129. Housing Bias Bill Passed at Albany, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1959, at 11; Black
Papers, supra note 60, at Box 9; Robison, supra note 128, at 47.
130. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, AN
EXAMPLE FOR THE NATION (1951) (on file with author); Black Papers, supra note 60,
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amended its discrimination law to make it a misdemeanor for housing
projects receiving government aid to discriminate. The specific purpose
of the bill was to apply fair housing rules to the previously exempted
Stuyvesant Town development.131
Housing activists were very successful in raising attention to the
problems of housing discrimination in the early 1950s, and the bills
they passed were models for future legislation. But two years after the
passage of the New York City law in 1951, no more than sixty Negro
families occupied the more than 23,000 units covered by the ordinance.132 Not one suit had been brought under the Wicks-Austin Act.133
The limitations of these laws would become increasingly obvious as
New York’s redevelopment program was implemented. During the
early 1950s, the role of urban renewal in entrenching segregation in
cities across the country would take on increasing prominence, and
bring activists once again to Washington, D.C., in search of solutions.
In his 1952 Address to the National Conference on Discrimination
in Housing, Robert Weaver gave an interim report on the impact of
urban renewal, and he concluded that the program was in some ways
worse than expected. “What was not anticipated,” Weaver argued, “was
that slum clearance under Title I, in combination with continuation of
FHA neglect of the Negro market would engender a new and extremely
costly racial discrimination in urban shelter.”134 While the program was
still relatively new, African-American neighborhoods across the country were targeted for redevelopment. The demolition of their homes
exacerbated an already tight housing market, and discrimination made
it even more difficult for blacks to find adequate housing.
New York and Chicago were the furthest advanced in the implementation of the urban renewal program. In New York, Robert Moses’
“redevelopment machine” had under construction or in the planning
stages dozens of public and private housing developments. While the
at Box 9. During the 1950s, several other states and cities passed laws banning discrimination in urban renewal. See Harold Saks & Sol Rabkin, Racial and Religious
Discrimination in Housing: A Report of Legal Progress, 45 IOWA L. REV. 488, 508
(1960).
131. See Council Passes Bill Barring Bias in All City-Aided Private Housing, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 1951, at 1; Black Papers, supra note 60, at Box 9; BIONDI, supra note
8, at 197.
132. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS FORBIDDING DISCRIMINATION AND SEGREGATION IN PUBLICLY
ASSISTED HOUSING (UNH Papers, Box 42, Folder 430) (on file with author).
133. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR’S ACTION REPORT ( June 24, 1952) (Black Papers, Box 9) (on file
with author).
134. Robert C. Weaver, Address at the National Conference on Discrimination in
Housing (May 20, 1952) (Weaver Papers, Supplement, Box 6) (on file with author).
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renewal of the city was celebrated by most, liberals became increasingly concerned about the impact of demolition on working-class New
Yorkers. A 1953 City Planning Commission Study estimated that between 1946 and 1953, 170,000 people had been uprooted for New
York’s rebirth. The same report estimated that an additional 150,000
people would be uprooted between 1954 and 1957.135 A disproportionate number of these dislocatees were black. In their search for housing,
they increased densities in the few neighborhoods where they could
secure housing, creating new “blighted” areas.136
Chicago, like New York, had begun urban renewal before the passage
of the federal act. The city’s first major project, Lake Meadows, also
revealed the racial impact of urban redevelopment. While many agreed
that parts of the renewal area were “blighted,” developer New York
Life Insurance created a controversy when it selected for development
a stable middle-class black section. In order to guarantee success for
the middle-class high-rise development, New York Life wanted an
unobstructed view of Lake Michigan. Even renewal advocates acknowledged that it was a “well-kept Negro area where the bulk of the
property is resident owned, its taxes paid and its maintenance above
par.”137 The residents opposed the condemnation of their homes, and
argued that “if it’s a slum clearance program, then let’s make it that
and start where the slums are.”138
Once again, housing programs presented conflicts to antidiscrimination activists. Unlike many other builders, New York Life
had agreed to make the project a “mixed-race” development. As a result, it received the support of much of the city’s black leadership.
Weaver and other housing activists also backed the southside development, which they believed would provide a model for interracial
living.139 They did this at the expense of middle-class and poor blacks
who would be uprooted. Fair housing activists realized the complications this created. “We need also to understand and prepare for certain
inevitable pressures in the Negro community itself against the diffusion
of the Negro community, which is, of course, the ultimate object of our
program,”140 stated NAACP attorney Marian Wynn Perry. “This is typ135. CARO, supra note 57, at 967–69.
136. See CARO, supra note 57, at 969; PRITCHETT, supra note 10, at 120–21.
137. HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 102–05.
138. Citizens Hold Huge Rally to Block Land Grab, PITTSBURGH COURIER, June
25, 1949.
139. See WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO, supra note 65, at 339–340.
140. Letter from Marian Wynn Perry, Assistant Special Counsel, NAACP, to Hortense Gabel ( July 13, 1949) (NAACP Papers, Part 5: Housing, Roll 17) (on file with
author).

CLASS AND THE LIMITATIONS OF FAIR HOUSING LAW

425

ified by the reaction of the Negro community to the proposals for redevelopment of the South Side in Chicago.”141 While acknowledging
that this opposition was the result of real housing pressures caused by
discrimination, for at least some housing activists, sacrifices had to be
made in the name of interracial progress.
The Lake Meadows project forced a tough choice for fair housing
activists, but most renewal projects did not. They clearly did not advance the cause of housing integration. Instead, what Weaver saw in
urban renewal in 1952 was what he had called the “triple threat.” Blacks
were “caught between slum clearance, residential segregation and lack
of new construction.” Blacks, willing to pay high prices to secure decent housing, were moving into new neighborhoods, creating “pressure
turnover, a process in which present occupants reluctantly leave their
abodes under the impetus of high selling prices or the fear of heralded
neighborhood deterioration.”142 As a result, Weaver argued, unlike prior
policies, which allowed private parties to create segregated living patterns, “today a local agency, operating with federal funds and blessed
with approval of a federal agency, can and does affect the whole job
of racial displacement.”143
Fair housing advocates did make progress in one federally funded
program—public housing. Early public housing was strictly segregated
at its inception. Bowing to pressure from southern legislators, the Interior Department adopted the “neighborhood composition rule,” requiring that any project have the same tenant body as the surrounding
neighborhood. NAACP lawyers had fought public housing segregation
since the inception of the program, and they made sporadic progress
during the 1940s. In 1939, New York state passed a law banning discrimination in public housing.144 In the 1940s, however, courts remained
reluctant to contradict Plessy’s145 “separate but equal” understanding of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and they rejected several claims that housing authorities operated in a manner that violated the constitution.146 The
HHFA ignored pleas to bar segregation, claiming that the rejection of the
Bricker-Cain Amendment made it powerless to act.147
141. Id.
142. Robert C. Weaver, Address at the National Conference on Discrimination in
Housing (May 20, 1952) (Weaver Papers, Supplement, Box 6) (on file with author).
143. Id.
144. See Saks & Rabkin, supra note 130, at 508.
145. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
146. See, e.g., Favors v. Randall, 40 F. Supp. 743 (1941) (holding that because
blacks would receive housing in excess of proportion of population, segregation did
not violate constitution).
147. See Letter from Robert C. Weaver, President, NCDH, to Raymond Foley, Administrator, HHFA (Nov. 20, 1951) (available in the Papers of Gerald Horne, Amistad
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In the early 1950s, fair housing advocates achieved numerous successes in this area as many cities and states passed laws prohibiting
segregation in public housing.148 The NAACP Legal Defense Fund also
initiated a program of attacking public housing segregation, winning
cases in, among other cities, Detroit, San Francisco, and Newark149 In
many cities, housing authorities discovered that maintenance of segregated projects was too inefficient and prevented them from achieving
other goals. The New York City Housing Authority, under the control
of Robert Moses, long an opponent of “mixing housing and social
problems,” actively began to support integration efforts during these
years.150 Open access in public housing was made necessary by the
immense problems of relocation brought on by urban redevelopment.
In order to quickly clear sites, public housing had to be more flexible
in its tenant selection. As a result, public housing became the first true
experiment in integrated living.
Throughout the remainder of Truman’s term, HHFA officials fought
vigorously against any changes in their standard practices. In the most
obvious example of continued federal support for housing discrimination, the agency approved a massive loan to the Levitt Brothers
Corporation to build a Levittown in Morrisville, Pennsylvania. In
discussing the project that would be located adjacent to a gigantic
United States Steel plant, William Levitt frequently stated that the
development would be for whites only.151 While advocates asked the
federal government to apply the President’s executive order, HHFA
officials stated, “it was not the purpose of these Rules to forbid segregation or to deny the benefits of the National Housing Act to persons
who might be unwilling to disregard race, color or creed in the selection of their purchasers or tenants.”152 Administrator Foley asked for
Research Center, Tulane University) (on file with author) [hereinafter Horne Papers];
Statement from B.T. McGraw, Deputy Assistant to the Administrator, HHFA, The
Aftermath of Shelley v. Kraemer on Residential Restriction by Race (Aug. 29, 1952)
(NACCP Papers, Roll 8) (on file with author).
148. See Saks & Rabkin, supra note 130, at 513–14; McGraw, supra note 147.
149. See Detroit Housing Comm’n v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180 (1955); Banks v. Housing
Authority of San Francisco, 260 P.2d 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953); Seawell v. MacWithey,
63 A.2d 542 (N.J. Super Ct. 1949); see also MEYER, supra note 8, at 142. But see
West v. Housing Authority of Atlanta, 84 S.E.2d 30 (Ga. 1954), for an opposite result.
150. See PRITCHETT, supra note 10, at 98–99.
151. Letter from Robert Weaver, Chairman NCDH, to Raymond Foley (Nov. 20,
1951) (available in the Horne Papers, Amistad Research Center) (on file with author);
NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR’S ACTION REPORT (UNH Papers, Box 42, Folder 431) (on file with author);
HIRSCH, supra note 96, at 213–14.
152. HIRSCH, supra note 96, at 213.
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patience and acknowledgement of the “many things he has done” for
minorities.153
Policymakers in the Truman Administration disappointed fair housing advocates, but at least that regime had provided some moral support
for the cause. When the Eisenhower Administration took office, such
affinity almost disappeared.154 Eisenhower’s choice for HHFA Administrator, Albert M. Cole, was a former congressman who had been a
vocal opponent of public housing, rent control, and many other federal
housing policies. Most housing groups, including the NYSCDH and
the NAACP vigorously opposed his nomination. “It is no exaggeration
to say that his appointment would be disastrous to the National Housing
Program,” declared Hortense Gabel.155
Fair housing advocates would be frequently disappointed in Cole’s
approach to housing discrimination. In his public statements, Cole professed that his job was to serve his clients (real estate developers and
housing consumers) and that he was not primarily concerned with “social issues.”156 Cole acknowledged that “too often, the workings of our
free economy do not provide solutions that benefit minorities,” and
concluded that housing discrimination could be overcome by education
of homebuilders and neighborhood residents. His main proposal to
solve housing discrimination was the creation of a special financing
tool to promote home building for the “Negro market.”157 In Gabel’s
assessment, special financing “utterly failed to come to grips with minority housing problems.”158 Fair housing activists expressed further
concern that Cole sought to create a separate housing market just for
blacks in reliance on the Plessy doctrine that would be repudiated just
a few months later.159 While acknowledging the problem of housing
153. See Letter from Frank Horne to Robert Weaver (May 29, 1952) (Horne Papers,
Box 3) (on file with author); Anti-Bias Progress in Housing Hailed, N.Y. TIMES, May
21, 1952, at 18.
154. On Eisenhower and Civil Rights, see ROBERT BURK, THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS (Dewey Grantham ed., 1988); STEPHEN AMBROSE, EISENHOWER THE PRESIDENT 9–10 (1984); MEYER, supra note 8, at 154.
155. Memorandum from Hortense Gabel to Members and Friends of the Committee
on Discrimination in Housing (Feb. 20, 1953) (UNH Papers, Box 42, Folder 430) (on
file with author); see also HIRSCH, supra note 96, at 219.
156. Albert Cole, What is the Federal Government’s Role in Housing? (Feb. 8, 1954)
(UNH Papers, Box 58, Folder 13) (on file with author).
157. Id.
158. Letter from Robert Weaver and Hortense Gabel to Albert Cole ( Jan. 13, 1954)
(UNH Papers, Box 58, Folder 13) (on file with author); Memo from Hortense Gabel
to Members of the Executive Board and Key People ( Jan. 15, 1954) (UNH Papers,
Box 58, Folder 13) (on file with author).
159. Letter from Robert Weaver and Hortense Gabel, to Albert Cole ( Jan. 13, 1954)
(on file with author).
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discrimination, Cole believed that “this is not primarily a federal problem.”160 Development policies, Cole argued, were made at the local
level. The federal government “can only assist the communities to do
their job. . . .”161
The localist philosophy of the Eisenhower Administration was put
to a crucial test by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board
of Education.162 To civil rights advocates, this decision repudiated the
principle of “state’s rights” and made the federal government responsible for upholding the constitutional principle of equality.163 While
Brown did not address neighborhood segregation, the case had a major
effect on the fair housing movement by providing a moral basis for the
argument that housing discrimination was wrong. Writing soon after
the decision, Hortense Gabel reported to fair housing advocates that
the decision brings “into sharp focus the underlying basis of all American institutional segregation. The great principles enunciated in the
school cases will democratize American living only to the extent that
housing and neighborhood segregation are eliminated.”164
Brown forced federal housing administrators to once again acknowledge the failure of the housing sector to meet the needs of minorities.
FHA Administrator Norman Mason, in a speech to the NCDH annual
conference just days after the decision, stated that he would commit to
making “the benefits of the entire mortgage systems . . . available to all
families on an equal basis, irrespective of race, color, creed or national
origin.” He also promised to “institute a concrete program of training
and orientation of all staff personnel” to make them more sensitive to
the needs of minority citizens.165
NAACP leaders also committed to bring legal action to force the
HHFA to require builders of suburban developments to accept applications from minorities. “We believe we have evolved a sound theory
for legal action concerning FHA insurance programs,” NAACP counsel
Constance Baker Motley stated.166 But court cases failed to bring much
160. Cole, supra note 156.
161. Albert Cole, Address at the Economic Club of Detroit (Feb. 8, 1954) (UNH
Papers, Box 58) (on file with author); see also MEYER, supra note 8, at 158; BURK,
supra note 154, at 115.
162. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
163. For further discussion on Brown, see KLUGER, supra note 9; DUDZIAK, COLD
WAR CIVIL RIGHTS, infra note 280; WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD
HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK
CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
164. Memo from Hortense Gabel ( June 16, 1954) (UNH Papers, Box 58, Folder
13) (on file with author).
165. Norman P. Mason, Address to Sixth Annual NCDH Conference (May 21,
1954); see also FHA to Support Minority Housing, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1954, at 18.
166. No-Bias Goal Set for U.S. Housing, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1954, at 11.
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relief to blacks excluded from housing. In 1955, Motley and Thurgood
Marshall filed suit against the Levitt Corporation and the FHA to
require them to accept applications from blacks at its Pennsylvania
development. The suit alleged that the relationship between Levitt and
the government was so intimate and the government’s role so crucial
that the Levitt Corporation could be deemed an agent of the federal
government.167 The plaintiffs further argued that in constructing
streets, schools, sewage, and other infrastructure, the Levitt Corporation was “in effect a municipality and a branch of the government
of Pennsylvania.”168
The district court, however, did not buy these arguments, and it summarily dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. It might be true that
the FHA should bar recipients of mortgage guarantees from discriminating, the court concluded, “but that is something which can be done
only by Congress and which cannot be forced upon the agencies in
question by the courts through the medium of the injunctive process.”169
The court declined to interpret broadly the theory of state action enunciated in Shelley.170
NAACP lawyers did convince the Superior Court of California that
federally insured developers had an obligation to provide housing on
an equal basis. In Ming v. Horgan,171 they made similar arguments with
greater success. Relying on Brown, the court found for the plaintiffs,
stating that if it did not do so, “gone would be the principle of integration which seems to have become the law of the land as a necessary
component of that equality of right required by the Constitution.”172
But these were small victories. A year after the Brown decision, fair
housing advocates still were waiting to see the principles of equal treatment applied to federal housing programs. In March of 1955, Algernon
Black, NCDH chair, wrote President Eisenhower complaining that despite the President’s promises that the federal government would not
contribute to racial segregation, “the federal government continues to
grant funds to local housing authorities for the construction of segregated public housing and FHA and VA continue to underwrite racially
167. See Johnson v. Levitt and Sons, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 114, 116 (E.D. Pa. 1955);
see also Statement from Constance Baker Motley (Mar. 14, 1955) (NCDH Papers, Box
1, Folder 2, Amistad Research Center, Tulane University) (on file with author); Levitts,
Builders, Sued on Bias Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1955, at 23.
168. Johnson, 131 F. Supp. at 117.
169. Id. at 116.
170. See Hackley v. Art Builders, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 851 (D. Md. 1960).
171. 3 Race Relations L. Rep. 693 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super Ct. 1958).
172. Id. at 698; see also Saks & Rabkin, supra note 130, at 513; Note, Racial
Discrimination in Housing, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 521 (1959).
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exclusive developments.”173 Black asked for an explicit federal order
barring segregation. “We respectfully submit that the time for action to
bar segregation in all federally assisted housing programs is now.”174
In response to consistent complaints about the failure of his agency,
Cole argued that its efforts had been “vigorous, continuing and I believe, productive.”175 Cole noted that he had spoken frequently to builders, exhorting them to provide for the “Negro market,” and that he had
created a special program, the Voluntary Home Mortgage Credit Program, to assist minority families.176 In a letter to Senator Prescott Bush,
Cole complained that fair housing advocates wanted “a rigid agreement
that the recipients [of federal aid] agree to eliminate racial segregation
and require integration.”177 However, Cole did not believe “that so drastic a step is possible or desirable at this time.”178 Cole argued that a
requirement of nondiscrimination would result in “a sharp cutback in
the rate of housing production, and of our capacity to meet the housing
needs of all the people.”179 Echoing the recent statements of the President in response to the escalating school crisis, Cole stated, “undue
Federal intervention is incompatible with our ideas of political and
economic freedom.”180 He further argued that “the problems of racial
discrimination are peculiarly local,” and that “we should rely heavily
on local responsibility and local wisdom to work out solutions. . . .”181
NCDH leaders responded that Cole’s position represented “a clear
abdication of federal responsibility” that “Mr. Cole’s homily upon local
rights and privileges to exercise racial discrimination in varying degrees
smacks of the argument completely rejected by the United States Supreme Court.”182 In response to Cole’s argument that builders would
reject federal assistance, NCDH director Frances Levenson stated that
“this would be their privilege,” but she noted that developers had not
173. Letter from Algernon Black, Chair, National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, to President Dwight Eisenhower (Mar. 2, 1955) (available in NAACP
Papers, Roll 12) (on file with author).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Letter from Algernon Black, Chair, National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, to President Dwight Eisenhower (Mar. 2, 1955) (available in NAACP
Papers, Roll 12) (on file with author).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Letter from Frances Levenson, Executive Director, National Committee
Against Discrimination in Housing, to Senator Prescott Bush ( July 23, 1956) (Black
Papers, Box 9) (on file with author). For a critique of the Voluntary Mortgage Credit
Program, see MEYER, supra note 8, at 157; BURK, supra note 154, at 118.
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turned down federal subsidies in New York when required to provide
open housing.183
By mid-decade, fair housing advocates viewed federal lobbying efforts as hopeless and declared, “the period of negotiation with HHFA
had been exhausted.”184 “The record of the FHA with regard to the
production of homes for minority groups has indeed been a sorry
one.”185 Federal housing officials rejected calls for greater intervention
into housing markets because they believed such activities exceeded
their purview. Local communities, in their view, were best equipped to
determine the most appropriate allocation of housing, which, of course
meant that private developers controlled access to the market. At the
same time federal officials relied on this localist philosophy, they argued that housing production would “lift all boats” and benefit all
home-seekers. The increasing segregation within American cities and
between suburbs and inner cities belied the claims that the private market could solve such problems, but fair housing activists were powerless
to secure greater federal involvement. In response, activists decided
that the battle for open housing “had to be waged in relation to specific
programs in specific localities.”186 Their primary locations were the City
and State of New York.187
IV. The Politics of Fair Housing in New York

Unlike FHA officials or others in the federal government, whose deepseated opposition to expansion of federal authority infused the debates
over not only housing, but also schools and other issues, New York
politicians presented a much more favorable audience to fair housing
activists. Claims to local deference had less power in the state and made
little sense in individual cities, so the debates focused on the efficacy
of fair housing laws. Even in this liberal city and state, however, deeply
held views about the appropriate role of government in regulating private property presented serious obstacles to efforts to pass fair housing
legislation. During the decade, as black political power increased at the
183. Letter from Frances Levenson, Executive Director, National Committee
Against Discrimination in Housing, to Senator Prescott Bush (July 23, 1956) (Black
Papers, Box 9) (on file with author).
184. Id.
185. Frances Levenson, Testimony Before the House Committee on Banking and
Currency (May 21, 1956) (available in Black Papers, Box 9) (on file with author).
186. NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR’S REPORT (May 1956) (NAACP Papers, Part 5, Supplement, Roll 8) (on file
with author).
187. Id.
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same time that attention to civil rights causes grew, the fair housing
movement succeeded in passing several laws that became national
models. But these successes were limited in their actual impact and did
little to stem the tide of segregation.
During the early 1950s, while continuing to press for changes in
federal rules, activists worked consistently to increase the coverage of
fair housing laws in New York. Their efforts were stymied at both the
state and city levels until 1954, when the New York City Council agreed
to do what the HHFA would not, regulate housing produced with federal mortgage insurance. Citing the almost complete exclusion of blacks
from federally insured housing, activists argued, “the time for effective
enforcement is now.”188 With several projects under construction and
others to follow, activists argued that the implementation of open housing would be much easier if done from the beginning. To the surprise
of many, the Sharkey-Brown-Isaacs bill, which prohibited discrimination in developments of more than three units, passed the Council unanimously without much debate.189
While important, this law covered only a few buildings, and was
limited to rental apartments.190 New York built more federally insured
housing than most American cities, but the lion’s share of single family
housing development occurred in the suburbs.191 In order to achieve
their primary goal of opening access to minorities in these areas, fair
housing advocates focused on state legislation. In 1955, they pushed
the Metcalf-Baker bill to expand state coverage to federally insured
apartments and single-family houses in developments of more than
ten.192 Buoyed by the Brown decision, which they argued, “established
the legal and constitutional ethic that a democratic government may
not tolerate . . . segregation,” the NYSCDH argued “affirmative action
is still required in New York State to give full meaning to these basic
concepts.”193 In response to critics of the law who said it was an un188. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS FORBIDDING DISCRIMINATION AND SEGREGATION IN PUBLICLY
ASSISTED HOUSING (Jan. 14, 1954) (UNH Papers, Box 42, Folder 430) (on file with
author).
189. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING,
SHARKEY-BROWN-ISAACS LAW FORBIDDING DISCRIMINATION IN FHA INSURED HOUSING ENACTED (July 14, 1954) (UNH Papers, Box 42, Folder 430) (on file with author);
Robison, supra note 128, at 51–52.
190. SHARKEY-BROWN-ISAACS LAW, supra note 189.
191. SHARKEY-BROWN-ISAACS LAW, supra note 189.
192. SHARKEY-BROWN-ISAACS LAW, supra note 189.
193. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, NEW
YORK STATE NEEDS A FAIR HOUSING PRACTICES LAW (Dec. 1956) (UNH Papers, Box
58, Folder 13) (on file with author).
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constitutional restriction on property rights, advocates argued, “it would
be a limitation on the use of property in the interest of human needs
and rights,” a “concept that has long been accepted in Anglo-American
law.”194 It would not “compel integration,” but was “designed to provide the opportunity to all to bargain on an equal basis in a free market.”195 Like the New York City law, the Metcalf-Baker bill passed
without much debate because it applied only to future construction.196
Meant to regulate major subdivisions like Levittown on Long Island,
the Metcalf-Baker law did increase the possibilities for black homeseekers, but few families were interested in being pioneers in hostile
communities. Few blacks, or other minorities, had the financial means
to pursue these opportunities, and many who did focused on New York
City neighborhoods in Brooklyn and Queens that were already undergoing racial transition.197 Discrimination continued in suburban developments, and not many minorities were willing to invest the time it
took to bring a claim of discrimination under the act. An NCDH study
found that only seventy-one complaints had been filed in the nine
months of 1958.198
Another important aspect of the fair housing campaign in Albany
sought to change the enforcement of housing laws by giving the State
Commission Against Discrimination (SCAD) the authority to investigate and mediate claims of discrimination. Advocates believed this procedure would be more effective, because it would not rely on the ability
of individual claimants to secure legal assistance.199 Activists hoped to
secure greater government involvement in the regulation of housing
discrimination. “Experience shows,” they argued, “that administrative
enforcement of anti-discrimination laws is more effective and more
equitable than enforcement by individual court suits.”200 SCAD, they
asserted, would be able to “establish a long-range program and then
proceed to carry it out.”201
194. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE PROPOSED FAIR HOUSING PRACTICES BILL (Dec. 1956)
(UNH Papers, Box 58, Folder 13) (on file with author).
195. Id.
196. See Harriman Widens Housing Bias Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1955, at 21;
BIONDI, supra note 8, at 352.
197. See STEVEN GREGORY, BLACK CORONA: RACE AND THE POLITICS OF PLACE
IN AN URBAN COMMUNITY (1998); PRITCHETT, supra note 10.
198. 1959 Metcalf-Baker Bill (Feb. 1959) (UNH Papers, Box 58) (on file with author); Private Housing Eludes Negroes, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1957, at 1.
199. See Robison, supra note 128, at 52–53; Black Papers, supra note 60, at Box 9.
200. Black Papers, supra note 60, at Box 9.
201. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF A BILL TO AMEND THE EXECUTIVE LAW (Feb. 1956)
(NAACP Papers, Part 5, Supplement, Roll 1) (on file with author).
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Real estate interests and conservatives opposed to the expansion of
state government fought these provisions.202 One of the primary reasons
that many politicians were opposed to the expansion of SCAD authority
was that in the newly elected Democratic administration of Averell
Harriman, they would have less control over the regulators. Real estate
officials were particularly concerned about the expansion of housing
regulation because Governor Harriman appointed Abrams and Weaver
to oversee the enforcement of housing laws. In January 1955, Weaver
became deputy commissioner of Housing and appointed Abrams administrator of the Temporary State Rent Commission.203 In 1956,
Abrams became SCAD chair and Weaver took his place as Rent commissioner. Harriman stated that there were no two people in the state
more qualified.204
Abrams, not surprisingly, took a very active role in the enforcement
of the fair housing laws. By 1957, Abrams was reporting progress in
the sale of housing to blacks. “In developments with houses priced up
to $14,000, sales of homes by whites to Negroes and Negroes to whites
were occurring in ordinary course.”205 Abrams convinced the HHFA to
refuse insurance to New York developers found in violation of the state
laws, and he continued to push for investigations of discriminatory
practices even after the Metcalf-Baker law was contested in court.206
While most builders accepted the new regulations, some developers
argued that the laws illegally restricted the “fundamental right” of a
property owner to “choose whether or not he will sell or rent.”207 Developers further claimed that the law was “a step toward the State control of private property and is contrary to our accepted political beliefs.”208 In a 1958 opinion, however, Supreme Court Judge Samuel W.
Eager declared the act valid.209 “Involved here, it is said, is an apparent
collision of rights, namely a clash between the right on the one hand
202. See Black Papers, supra note 60, at Box 9.
203. Memorandum from Frances Levenson, Executive Director, National Committee
Against Discrimination in Housing, to the National Committee Against Discrimination
in Housing Board and Cooperating Organizations (Jan. 24, 1955) (on file with author).
204. Harriman Defers Decision on Asking Rise in Income Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
31, 1951, at 1; HENDERSON, supra note 34, at 158.
205. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, EXCERPTS FROM THE REMARKS OF COMMISSIONER CHARLES ABRAMS (NAACP Papers,
Part 5, Supplement, Roll 11) (on file with author).
206. See Black Papers, supra note 60, at Box 9; U.S. Backs State on Housing Bias,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1957, at 1.
207. In re New York State Comm’n Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apartments, Inc., 170 N.Y.S.2d 750, 757 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 761.
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of the private owner of property to enjoy and use it” against the right
of “all individuals here to be treated equally and free of all discrimination. . . .”210 In the end, Eager stated, the question was between the
“rights of the private property owner and the inherent power of the
State to regulate the use and enjoyment of private property in the interest of public welfare.”211 That power, Eager concluded, was within
the state’s constitutional limits and was valid if reasonably exercised.212
Just nine years before, the New York Court of Appeals had stated that
if civil rights activists wanted the government to regulate housing discrimination, they would have to secure legislation to that effect. Fair
housing advocates succeeded in doing this, and the courts granted deference to the legislature.
By 1957, the civil rights movement was a major part of the national
consciousness, and Congress vigorously debated the first major bill in
ninety years.213 Fair housing activists were emboldened by the increasing sympathy for their cause, and they pushed for further expansion of
anti-discrimination laws by introducing the first bill that would cover
private housing entirely. “It is no secret to the Southlands that New
York State, whose Senators have so earnestly battled the filibuster
against civil rights in Washington, D.C., has not begun to tackle the
real job of eliminating the ghetto living within its own borders,” Algernon Black claimed in January of 1957.214 “In fact, there are many
Southern communities where housing is more truly integrated than, for
instance, in our own New York City.”215 Advocates argued that prior
laws covered only a small portion of the housing sector, and that attempts to persuade developers “that it was their moral obligation to
observe a policy of non-discrimination in the rental and sales of housing
. . . have proven to be in vain.”216 Claiming that of the 100,000 houses
built in New York since World War II, only 900 had been sold to
minorities, they argued, “nothing would serve as a basis to eliminate
210. Id.
211. Id. at 757.
212. Pelham, 170 N.Y.S. 2d. at 759. A similar statute did not fare as well in Washington State. There, a court held the anti-discrimination law unconstitutional on the
grounds that it impermissibly distinguished between FHA-funded housing and other
housing. See O’Meara v. Washington State Board. Against Discrimination, 365 P.2d
1, 5 (Wash. 1960).
213. On the Civil Rights Act, see ROBERT CARO, LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF
THE SENATE (2002); BURK, supra note 154, at 208–26; LAWSON, supra note 8, at 55–
56; CASHMAN, supra note 8, at 134–137; SITKOFF, supra note 8, at 32–34.
214. Press Release, New York State Committee Against Discrimination in Housing
(Jan. 21, 1957) (Black Papers, Box 10) (on file with author).
215. Id.
216. Id.
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New York’s ghetto living practices other than a far-reaching fair housing practices law.”217 Algernon Black claimed earlier laws had done
“just about nothing at all for the Jewish and Catholic and other minority
families who are prevented from buying homes or renting apartments
in many accurately-described exclusive communities in our state.”218
The new Metcalf-Baker bill would ban discrimination in all buildings
of more than three units and in the sale of single-family homes built in
groups of ten or more.
Weaver claimed that opening the suburbs to blacks was crucial to
the future efficiency of the real estate market. By siphoning off middleincome nonwhites, open occupancy would decrease housing pressures
in urban areas. “More important,” Weaver argued, allowing blacks in
the suburbs “would do much to take the prestige out of racial exclusiveness, contributing greatly to the establishment of receptivity of nonwhite neighbors in all parts of metropolitan areas.”219
The bill received the support of a large sector of New York’s liberal
community. Reverend James Pike, dean of the Cathedral of St. John
the Divine, argued, “As long as our neighborhoods remain segregated,
so will most of our churches continue to serve ethnically homogeneous
communities. How can a minister of the gospel effectively preach
brotherhood and fellowship to a congregation who know intimately no
brother, no fellow other than those of their own race?”220 Governor
Harriman supported the bill, and the NYSCDH organized a series of
events to promote it, including a fundraiser at which Lena Horne and
other celebrities appeared.221 Jackie Robinson also spoke out in favor
of the bill stating “[t]he legislature should set the rules of the game by
passing a law protecting everybody’s right to freedom of choice in
finding a place to live.”222
Real estate groups, however, were vocal opponents of the legislation.
Harold Treanor, counsel to the Real Estate Board of New York, called
the bill a “startling and dangerous piece of legislation posing a serious
menace to the integrity of our developed, high-class residential areas.”223 Arguing it was not a violation of the Constitution to refuse
217. Id. See also Private Housing Eludes Negroes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1957, at 227.
218. Black Papers, supra note 60, at Box 10.
219. Robert Weaver, Non-White Population Movements and Urban Ghettos, 20
PHYLON 235, 240 (1959) (on file with author).
220. Reverend James A. Pike, Address at the Urban League of Greater New York
(Black Papers, Box 10) (on file with author).
221. See Harriman Urges Housing Bias End, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1957, at 47.
222. Press Release, Society for Ethical Culture (Black Papers, Box 10) (on file with
author).
223. Harold Treanor, Address to the Real Estate Board of New York (Apr. 16, 1957)
(Black Papers, Box 10) (on file with author). See also Bill to Bar Bias in Housing
Urged, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1957, at 20.
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accommodations on the grounds of race, Treanor claimed “this attempt
to scuttle private property rights and invade the domain of private property ownership for the purpose of compelling an owner to accept any
tenant is an alien philosophy which would ruin Manhattan’s fine residential areas. . . .”224 In response, Black argued that it was implicit “in
the protection of property rights that these rights will not be used to
harm the community.”225 Will Maslow and his associates at the American Jewish Congress filed a twenty-four page brief in support of the
law which claimed that the “infringement of property rights involved
in the proposed legislation is less severe than that sustained by owners
of housing under rent control cases,” and that it did not interfere with
the core rights of property.226 However, the political strength of the real
estate lobby coupled with concerns from upstate conservatives over
government regulation of private property prevented the bill from
emerging out of committee.
Stonewalled in Albany, fair housing advocates took their case to the
New York City Council. In the spring of 1957, Councilmen Sharkey,
Brown, and Isaacs introduced a bill to prohibit discrimination in the
sale or rental of homes. The only exceptions were rentals in one and
two family houses and the sale of homes in developments of less than
ten units.227 Violators could be subject to a fine of $500 or jail for
repeated violations.228 The bill also allowed private parties to sue in
court for injunctions against discrimination.229
“Fair housing,” argued Black in support of the bill, means “the right
to purchase, rent, lease, or occupy living quarters . . . without any restrictions. . . . Every individual should have the right to enter the housing market and to purchase and enjoy what he has the ability to pay
for.”230 Citing numerous studies that revealed the prevalence of housing
discrimination in the city, Black stated that exclusionary real estate
practices have institutionalized residential segregation. At the same
time, many Americans had shown that open housing works. There
224. Treanor, supra note 223.
225. Press Release, New York State Committee Against Discrimination in Housing
(Jan. 21, 1957) (Black Papers, Box 10) (on file with author).
226. Memorandum on Constitutionality of Metcalf-Baker Fair Housing Practices
Bill (NAACP Papers, Part 5, Supplement, Roll 1) (on file with author).
227. See City May Ban Bias in Private Rental, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1957, at 1;
City May Become First in Nation to Bar Bias in Private Housing, N.Y. TIMES, May
26, 1957, at R1.
228. City May Ban Bias in Private Rental, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1957, at 1.
229. Id.
230. Hearing Before the Committee on General Welfare, New York City Council
(June 7, 1957) (testimony of Algernon D. Black, New York State Committee Against
Discrimination in Housing) (Black Papers, Box 10) (on file with author).
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were, Black claimed, “scores of apartment houses, cooperatives and
neighborhoods where persons of all races, religions and nationalities
live side by side in peace, harmony and neighborliness. Not only have
property values been maintained, but the higher human values of all
have been preserved.”231
A wide variety of liberal organizations supported the bill. NAACP
President Roy Wilkins argued, “the restriction on freedom of residence
measurably nullifies the Supreme Court Decision of May 17, 1954 banning racial segregation in public education.”232 Wilkins asserted that the
denial of homeownership was a particular affront to blacks. Home, he
stated, is associated “with the warm aura of family life, with children,
and with progress in business or a profession. It does have this meaning
for most Americans, except Negro citizens. Even though they secure
an education, including technical skills and professions that place them
in middle and upper-income brackets, they meet only frustration and
heartache when they seek to purchase a home.”233 Several of the city’s
largest real estate developers also supported the legislation. One of the
most vocal was James Scheuer, who argued, “over a period of years,
the measure will stimulate constructive changes in our patterns of
living, and that this will take place smoothly for the greater good of
our community and with no adverse effects on the real estate industry.”234 Scheuer cited his experience with several developments in the
city and claimed that these buildings had flourished with nondiscriminatory policies.
Most of the city’s real estate sector, however, opposed the bill. Their
campaign against it was vigorous and organized. They distributed flyers
to tenants throughout the city and took out advertisements in the city’s
newspapers. Opponents argued that the bill represented government
intervention into completely private matters. “To compel owners and
managers to take tenants who may not be agreeable to their present
tenants we believe is an unwarranted invasion of private rights,” one
pamphlet argued.235 The legislation would, they argued, “destroy the
owner’s right to use his property as he sees fit.” Other real estate men
231. Id.
232. Hearing Before the Committee on General Welfare, New York City Council
(June 7, 1957) (testimony of Roy Wilkins) (NAACP Papers, Part 5, Supplement, Roll
2) (on file with author).
233. Id.
234. Hearing Before the Committee on General Welfare, New York City Council
(June 7, 1957) (testimony of James H. Scheuer) (on file with author).
235. REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, TENANTS CAN HELP PROTECT THEIR
OWN INTEREST (July 26, 1957) (on file with author). See also Real Estate Men Combat
Bias Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1957, at 19.
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called the bill an attempt to “sovietize private building.”236 In an unexpected twist, the New York Times also opposed the bill, calling it “the
wrong way to a right end.”237 While supportive of the objectives of the
bill, the editorial argued, “the method of compulsion is a dubious substitution for education and the admittedly gradual spread of understanding that can be the only sound foundation of complete neighborliness.”238 Calling the regulation of publicly funded housing essentially
different, the Times argued that change in private housing “must be a
matter of education and spiritual growth rather than a consequence of
legislation.” The editorial complained, “the people have not been adequately prepared for the passage of this bill,” and worried that “intolerance might be aggravated rather than diminished.”239 Unlike the debate over school segregation, which recognized that schools played a
crucial public function, even many liberals were concerned about the
expansion of government power into “private” housing.
Algernon Black replied that education is crucial, but “it is unjust and
impractical to think that those who are deprived will accept their deprivation until all men are educated out of their prejudice. Law can also
play an important part in education.”240 Black further asserted that “the
argument that this bill violates property rights is specious. . . . Those
who enter the housing market to make profit enjoy rights but they must
also face their responsibilities.”241 Sponsor Stanley Isaacs took issue
with the idea that there was an “inalienable right to select tenants” and
responded that “any such conflict of so-called rights, even if they existed, should be resolved, I believe, in favor of the minority which
suffers from discrimination.”242
As a result of vocal opposition, the Council decided to table the bill
until after the fall elections for mayor and city council, but fair housing
advocates continued to fight for its passage.243 After the fall elections,
the pressure from liberal activists resulted in the bill’s resuscitation.
Council passed an altered fair housing bill, which eliminated the monetary penalties and the provision for private suits. The new legislation
gave enforcement authority to the New York Commission on Intergroup
236. Black Papers, supra note 60, at Box 10.
237. Bias in Private Housing, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1957, at 16.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Algernon Black, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1957, at 25.
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243. See Realtors New Attack May Stall Vote on Bill to Ban Private Housing Bias,
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Relations (COIR).244 This organization, started in 1955, and headed by
former FHA race advisor Frank Horne, was responsible for working to
eliminate discrimination in public agencies and private corporations
and for mediation of neighborhood conflicts.245 Fair housing advocates
believed that the compromise was to their advantage: that Horne would
use the law to bring about change in the city’s racial segregation.246
The New York City law was the first in the nation to apply to private
housing, and it provided a model for future laws. Under the statute,
COIR took complaints, investigated them, and attempted to mediate the
conflict. If such intervention failed, the staff then referred the case to a
committee to determine if legal action should be taken.247 As expected
by fair housing advocates, the immediate impact of the law was small.
In the first fourteen months, COIR received 325 complaints. Threequarters of the cases were dropped because the claimant failed to provide additional information or because staff determined it had no jurisdiction.248 Seeking to mitigate opposition, administrators assiduously
avoided filing claims in court against recalcitrant owners. Not one landlord or seller was sued in the first two years of the act.249
COIR finally initiated a lawsuit against a landlord who stated “openly
and unequivocably that he will not rent to Negroes.”250 In a three page
opinion, the New York Supreme Court upheld the statute. The court
declared it would not question the wisdom of government regulation
in the housing market because solving the problem of discrimination
was too important. “It is now believed that many of our problems arising from the diverse nature of our population will be brought nearer
solution by integration.”251 The court further concluded that the “interference with private business” was no greater under the housing law
than under other anti-discrimination statutes that had been upheld.252
244. See Housing Bias Bill Set for Passage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1957, at 1; LongTerm Impact of Bias Law Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1957, at R1; see GERALD BENJAMIN, RACE RELATIONS AND THE NEW YORK CITY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
71–121 (1974) (discussing COIR).
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991, 1006 (1996).
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Just eleven years before, New York’s Court of Appeals had rejected
claims that housing discrimination was a matter of public concern.
While other cities and states continued to debate the appropriate role
of government in regulating race relations, New York’s legal system
accepted this regime change without significant comment.
The 1950s witnessed significant successes for the fair housing movement in New York. By 1957, fair housing laws covered a majority of
the dwellings in New York City. However, the enforcement of these
laws continued to rely on the individual initiative of complainants, and
on the diligence of understaffed agencies. In addition, they had limited
impact in areas where the high cost of housing prohibited access to
new markets. As suburban development continued and white flight increased, segregation intensified. Fair housing was winning the ideological battle while losing the integration war.
V. A National Movement

In 1955, Charles Abrams published his third book entitled, Forbidden
Neighbors: A Study of Prejudice in Housing. The book was a compilation of much of Abrams writing on housing discrimination, as well
as the work of his colleagues, and it quickly became required reading
for civil rights activists.253 Forbidden Neighbors placed the post-World
War II housing crisis in the long history of urban change, tracing the
arrival of European immigrants at the turn of the century. Abrams then
discussed the numerous ways that the process of incorporating new
black and Puerto Rican immigrants to American cities was different,
resulting in the creation of entrenched ghettos. Abrams spared no aspect
of society from criticism in this process, damning “homeowners
associations” that organized against blacks as well as the real estate
agents that promoted segregation. But he reserved particular disdain
for federal housing agencies, which he argued, institutionalized racism
by establishing standards that concluded that any interaction of races
was bad for property values.254 FHA policies, he argued, “gathered
together all the humbug of half-informed pseudo experts . . . and codified them into official dogma.”255 Relying on numerous studies of real
estate markets, Abrams vigorously critiqued the argument that the en-

Fair Housing Ordinance Upheld (Apr. 20, 1960) (NAACP Papers, Part 5, Supplement,
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trance of minorities caused a decline in property values and argued that
numerous factors played a role in neighborhood change.
After reviewing the numerous ways that government agencies inhibited the movement of racial minorities, and debunking the “fallacies”
that denigrated mixed neighborhoods, Abrams proposed a “Program
for Action” to promote equal access to housing. Included in his proposals were a long-range housing program that provided support for
low and middle-income housing, federal prohibition of discrimination
in government-supported housing, curtailment of slum clearance programs until adequate replacement housing was produced, and the creation of institutions at the local, state, and federal levels to improve race
relations.256
Catherine Bauer called Forbidden Neighbors “as timely in 1955 as
Uncle Tom’s Cabin was in 1852,” and many other policymakers praised
the book.257 Abrams’ publication was especially appropriate at that moment because it came at a time of increased national attention on the
issue. Throughout most of the 1950s, New York was the center of the
fair housing movement, but by 1957 it was only one location of many
where activists were working to eliminate housing discrimination. As
they had in New York, fair housing efforts focused on large apartment
buildings and new housing developments. During the second half of
the decade, the fair housing movement gained increasing support from
urban elites, particularly business and institutional leaders concerned
about the impact of increasing segregation on the future of the city.
However, as discrimination in both cities and suburbs persisted, fair
housing advocates began to adjust their demands. By the end of the
1950s, activists argued that experimental efforts to move a small number of middle class blacks into newly built suburbs were no longer
sufficient to bring about residential segregation. Combating segregation, they argued, required government regulation of the total housing
market. Their moral victories in securing national support for antidiscrimination laws were major achievements, but fair housing activists
were unable to win the battle for expanded government intervention
into the housing market.
Fair housing efforts were grassroots-based and diverse, but most relied
on the NCDH for support. Throughout the decade, the organization was
the primary advocacy group for open housing. The NCDH focused on
lobbying federal officials in the early 1950s, but it also served as a clear256. See id. at 346–89.
257. Catherine Bauer, The Issue that Cannot Wait, NATION, Sept. 3, 1955 (on file
with author); see also HENDERSON, supra note 34, at 157.
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inghouse for efforts around the nation. In 1954, Algernon Black reported
that the group had cooperated with dozens of organizations, including
the New Haven Human Relations Council, the Rochester Women’s
Council on Civil Rights, the Minneapolis Human Relations Council, and
the Norfolk Women’s Council for Interracial Cooperation.258
The Brown decision was an important impetus for an expanded national fair housing movement. In its 1954 pamphlet, “Ghettos: The Last
Barrier to Civil Rights,” the NCDH argued that the decision “poses
America’s ultimate civil rights challenge. The challenge is not in education but in housing.”259 The Brown decision, the pamphlet asserted,
foreshadowed “an eventual ruling against segregation in publicly-aided
housing—including every FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed house or
apartment development.”260 To push this process along, the group committed to an expanded program of research, technical advice, and leadership training.261
Fair housing activists were heartened by the increased attention
brought to their cause by the involvement of one of the nation’s largest
foundations. In 1955, The Fund for the New Republic, an organization
funded by the Ford Corporation, announced that it planned to conduct
a major study on housing discrimination in America. The Fund appropriated $100,000 to a commission led by Earl Schwulst, president of
the Bowery Bank, to support the effort. While the commission promised
an objective study of the housing market for minorities, it was clear
from the beginning that the organization’s leaders thought discrimination a serious problem. “Those who cannot find a place to live or
who are crowded into inadequate quarters and forced to pay an exorbitant price for them can hardly feel that they are enjoying the blessings
of liberty,” Schwulst stated in announcing the program.262 At the completion of the study, the group hoped to present “some concrete and
workable suggestions as to how government, private builders, realtors,
financial institutions, and civic groups can cooperate in bringing about
better living.”263 Weaver, Abrams, and NAACP Housing advisor Madison Jones played important roles in shaping the study.264
258. See Black Papers, The Work of the NCDH and the NYSCDH supra note 61,
at Box 9; SALTMAN, supra note 56, at 45–47.
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By 1957, twelve states were considering fair housing bills.265 While
only one (Washington) was enacted,266 activists appeared to be winning
the public relations battle over the issue of housing discrimination.
National journals such as Time and House and Home published favorable reports on the movement. The New York Times reported a survey
conducted by the University of Pennsylvania, which concluded, “general public acceptance of racially unsegregated housing may come
sooner than many experts have predicted.”267 Several national church
groups also declared their support for fair housing. At its annual conference, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church called on its
local churches to “weld their parishioners in covenants of open occupancy.”268 The Churches of the Disciples of Christ urged their members
to “encourage the development of neighborhoods where persons might
live without racial barriers.”269
While public sentiment may have been changing, fair housing advocates saw much to despair in the housing situation. In a 1957 statement, NAACP Chief Walter White argued that “strides toward full democratic equality have taken place in all fields save one . . . housing,”
and he cited statistics showing that segregation had increased in most
urban and suburban areas during the decade.270 Violent responses to the
arrival of black residents were still too frequent, as a particularly bad
incident in Levittown, Pennsylvania revealed. In August of 1957, the
Myers family purchased a home in the community, setting off nine days
of violence. More than 200 people greeted them on move-in day, shouting racial epithets and throwing stones that shattered the family’s front
windows.271 The next day, more than 500 protestors appeared. After
several months, tensions subsided and the Myers remained.272
PORT TO THE COMMISSION ON RACE & HOUSING, at vii (1960); MEYER, supra note 8,
at 141.
265. See 1 TRENDS IN HOUSING 1 (Feb.-Mar. 1957) (Black Papers, Box 9) (on file
with author) . The states were New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Minnesota, California, Oregon, Ohio, Illinois and New Mexico.
266. 1 TRENDS IN HOUSING, supra note 265, at 1.
267. 1 TRENDS IN HOUSING, supra note 265, at 1; see Housing Shift Seen, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 1957, at 77.
268. Presbyterians Ask Churchgoers to Aid Housing Bias Fight, N.Y. TIMES, May
31, 1957, at 1.
269. Church Attacks Racial Barriers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1956, at 15.
270. NEW YORK COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, THE 1957
HOUSING CHALLENGE (NAACP Papers, Part 5, Supplement, Roll 8) (on file with
author).
271. Levittown Incident Tests Bias of North, 2 TRENDS IN HOUSING 1 (Sept.–Oct.
1957) (on file with author).
272. See Peace is Restored to Levittown, Pa., 2 TRENDS IN HOUSING 1 (Dec. 1957–
Jan. 1958) (on file with author); MEYER, supra note 8, at 148.
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Just across the river in New Jersey, fair housing advocates continued
to fight segregated suburban developments. In 1957, the Levitt Corporation announced plans for a third Levittown, in Willingboro, New
Jersey. Once again, Levitt promised that the development, which would
have between 12,000 and 15,000 houses, would be for whites only.273
Such a project would violate New Jersey’s fair housing laws, which
prohibited discrimination in FHA funded housing. Calling Levittown
“a national—indeed an international—symbol of racial discrimination,” NCDH officials urged the FHA commissioner to deny funding.
They later asked the governor of New Jersey to request the state Division Against Discrimination to investigate all complaints against the
company and revoke Levitt’s certificate of incorporation.274 While
Levitt’s representatives met with NAACP leaders Roy Wilkins and
Thurgood Marshall, informing them that the developer was “seeking
to work something out,” his sales agents continued to turn away black
applicants.275
While they continued to struggle against big developers, fair housing
advocates gained increasing support from political and business leaders. In June 1958, the newly established Federal Commission on Civil
Rights announced that its first project would be to study discrimination
in voting, education, and housing.276 Later that year, the Fund for the
Republic released its two-year study of housing discrimination, and
called on the federal government to end support for segregated housing.
“[T]he policies of Federal housing agencies which encourage or permit
racial distinctions in the distribution of Federal housing benefits are
inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States,” the commission
argued.277
273. See Black Papers, supra note 60, at Box 12; Memorandum from Frances Levenson, Executive Director, National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing,
to Delegation Meeting with Governor Meyer Regarding Levittown, New Jersey (July
2, 1958) (Black Papers, Box 12) (on file with author); N.J. Levittown Started: Negro
Exclusion Stands, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., June 8, 1958, at 1.
274. See Letter from Algernon Black to Governor Robert Meyner (June 12, 1958)
(Black Papers, Box 12) (on file with author); Black Papers, The Work of the NCDH
and the NYSCDH supra note 60, at Box 9.
275. See Letter from Roy Wilkins to Samuel Williams, President, New Jersey
NAACP (June 19, 1958) (NAACP Papers, Part 5, Supplement, Roll 9) (on file with
author). The New Jersey Division Against Discrimination did file a complaint against
Levitt, which the corporation appealed all the way to the state Supreme Court. In a
unanimous opinion, the court upheld the statute. Levitt and Sons, Inc. v. Division
Against Discrimination, 158 A. 2d 177 (N.J. 1960); see also Press Release, NAACP
(June 16, 1960) (NAACP Papers, Part 5 Supplement, Roll 9) (on file with author).
276. See Civil Rights Unit to Open Studies, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1958, at 18.
277. WHERE SHALL WE LIVE? REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON RACE AND HOUSING 63–64 (1958).
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The study, which ultimately cost more than $400,000, examined the
housing situation in sixteen different cities.278 Entitled “Where Shall
We Live?,” the report chronicled consistent discriminatory practices
across the country that prevented minorities from finding a decent place
to live.279 Noting that segregation “seriously handicapped” the United
States in its attempts to gain the allegiance of the “uncommitted peoples
of Asia and Africa,” the report recommended a comprehensive fair
housing effort, including legislation at state and local levels, community action to educate Americans about the problem, and the engagement of developers and realtors in the effort.280 The report also advised
President Eisenhower to create a federal commission to study the problem and develop proposals to eliminate segregation. The report adopted
many of the suggestions of fair housing activists, including their longstanding proposal that urban renewal projects and public housing be
built on vacant land, and it suggested that New York’s state laws serve
as a model for other state governments.281 “Where Shall We Live?”
gave particular attention to the indignities facing middle-class black
families. “There are now many Negroes—and their number is increasing—who have achieved middle-class status economically and culturally and are ready to move out of the segregated Negro community into
the mainstream of American life,” it stated.282
Assessing the committee’s work, the editors of the New York Times
argued, “perhaps the most notable fact about the commissions findings
is that they came from a group usually regarded as highly conservative.”283 None of the members actively supported integration, and one
was a “highly respected realty man.”284 But, despite the mainstream
imprimatur provided by the Fund for the Republic, the Eisenhower
Administration continued to oppose federal involvement in the “local”
problem of discrimination. Federal housing officials rejected the proposal for a federal commission to study housing, arguing that it would
compete with other efforts. In a speech to the National Association of
Real Estate Boards just days after the release of the report HHFA Administrator Cole argued that because the government had not caused
278. See Major Study Set on Housing Bias, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1956, at 32; Black
Papers, supra note 60, at Box 10.
279. Black Papers, supra note 60, at Box 10.
280. See WHERE SHALL WE LIVE?, supra note 277, at 42, 66–67. On the role of the
Cold War in the debates over civil rights, see MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL
RIGHTS (2001).
281. See WHERE SHALL WE LIVE?, supra note 277, at 65–66.
282. Id. at 9.
283. Views on Housing Clarified by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1958, at R1.
284. Id.
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segregation, it had no responsibility to promote integration.285 In response to a proposed federal ban on housing discrimination introduced
in 1959 by Representative John Dingell, FHA Commissioner Norman
Mason stated that “the time had not come” for such a measure.286
During this same time period, HHFA officials found themselves consistently under attack, not just from fair housing advocates, but also
from mainstream political leaders. In the annual meeting of the Conference of Governors (a coalition of governors from northeast and midwestern states), the participants unanimously called on the President to
adopt expanded civil rights legislation.287 The governors acknowledged
that discrimination in housing was the area of greatest problem and
noted that many of their states were considering legislation to ban
discrimination.288
The day after the Governors’ announcement, the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission began a two-day hearing on housing discrimination in
New York City.289 Several fair housing activists, including Algernon
Black and Charles Abrams testified at the hearings, and all called on
the commission to recommend that federal government prohibit discrimination in publicly assisted housing. Abrams accused the federal
government of “evading its responsibility under civil rights statutes to
give all citizens equal access to the housing market.”290 Earl Schwulst
criticized federal agencies, noting that “formal neutrality has the practical effect of supporting existing practices. It also represents moral
sanction, for if the Government, expressing a public policy, sees nothing wrong in racial discrimination, how can private persons be censured
for practicing it?”291 Jackie Robinson testified that he had been obstructed in his efforts to start an open housing development in the city.
“I guarantee,” he said, “that bean balls are still being thrown in the
housing field as well as on the ball field.”292 Critiquing the city’s discrimination laws, James Andrews of the Real Estate Board of New York
argued that “the property owner of New York is primarily a business
man, not a social reformer.”293 Andrews suggested that those who sup285. Cole Bars Part in Segregation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1958, at 46.
286. U.S. Opposes Ban on Housing Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1959, at 9.
287. President Urged to Lead on Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1959, at 44.
288. Id.
289. Hearings Before the United States Commission on Civil Rights (Jan. 2, 1959)
(on file with author).
290. U.S. Inquiry Begun on Bias in Housing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1959, at 23.
291. U.S. Inquiry Begun on Bias in Housing, supra note 290, at 24.
292. U.S. Unit Here Gets Housing Bias Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1959, at 24.
293. Id.

448

THE URBAN LAWYER

VOL. 35, NO. 3

SUMMER 2003

port open housing “translate their conviction into action” and undertake
projects with their own money “and not the investments of others.”294
In the fall of 1959, the commission released its first report on civil
rights in the nation. A deeply political document, the report reflected the
nation’s broad disagreement over the issue of civil rights. Echoing the
arguments of Black and Weaver, the commission found that housing was
“the one commodity in the American market that is not freely available
on equal terms to everyone who can afford to pay.”295 Housing discrimination, the commissioners concluded, was responsible for the creation
of slums and blight, as well as juvenile delinquency, disease, and crime.
However, the commission rejected proposals to prevent segregation. Arguing that “the need is not for a pattern of integrated housing,” but for
“equal opportunity to secure decent housing,” the commission recommended that “an appropriate biracial committee or commission on housing be established in all cities with substantial non-white populations”
to study the problem, receive complaints, and attempt to mediate them.296
Despite its moderate conclusions, several commission members felt
that the report went too far. In a supplemental statement, Commissioners Storey, Battle, and Carlton (all Southerners) expressed support for
local commissions, noting, “in dealing with the problem of housing,
we must face realities and recognize the fact that no one pattern will
serve the country as a whole.”297 They worried that “the repeated expressions, ‘freedom of choice,’‘open housing,’ and ‘scatteration’ suggest a fixed program of mixing the races anywhere and everywhere
regardless of the wishes of either race.”298 The result of this, they argued, “would be dissension, strife, and even violence evident in sections where you would least expect it.”299
While the commission was reluctant to promote integration as a goal,
it did state clearly that the government had a responsibility to prevent
discrimination. Citing the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the commission
further argued, “federal housing policies need to be better directed toward fulfilling the constitutional and congressional objective of equal
opportunity” and recommended that the President issue an executive
order prohibiting discrimination “in all Federally assisted housing.”300
294. Id.
295. Federal Panel Asks, “Inventive, Creative and Educational” Civil Rights Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1959, at 45.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Federal Panel Asks, “Inventive, Creative and Educational” Civil Rights Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1959, at 45.
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The commissioners also adopted several other proposals from fair housing advocates, recommending that public housing be built in vacant
areas away from established ghettos, and that the HHFA take a more
active role in overseeing urban renewal programs to ensure that they
do not exacerbate segregation.301
Although President Eisenhower signed the bill creating the Civil
Rights Commission, his administration ignored the commission’s housing recommendations. All the while, fair housing was a major issue in
many city and state legislatures. In December 1958, Pittsburgh passed
an anti-discrimination law even broader than what New York had enacted.302 In March 1959, the NCDH reported that thirteen states were
considering legislation.303 By June, Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Oregon had all passed legislation banning discrimination in
the sale or rental of housing.304 While they differed in some respects,
all the laws applied to the sale or rental of private housing and excepted
the sale of homes by the owners and rental of homes in which the owner
lived.305 All imitated New York’s complaint structure, granting government agencies the power to investigate claims of discrimination.306 Celebrating these gains, the NAACP reported “unmistakable signs of progress toward the ending of discrimination against Negroes.”307
While New York fair housing advocates celebrated the expanding
movement, they complained that New York had lost the lead. The state
fair housing bill languished in committee during 1958 and 1959.308 In
1960, Governor Rockefeller announced that he would make fair housing a priority, and he introduced his own bill, which was similar to that
passed by New York City in 1957. But, Algernon Black argued, “by
1960 the fair housing forces were moving ahead of the original city
law.”309 The adjustment in tactics reflected a changing understanding
of the law of discrimination.

301. Id.
302. It applied to the rentals and sales in developments of more than five units, and
also regulated the activities of real estate agents. See Pittsburgh “Open City” Law
Second in Nation, 3 TRENDS IN HOUSING 1 (Jan.–Feb. 1959) (on file with author).
303. See 13 States Weigh Bias Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1959, at R1.
304. See 1959 Record Year for State Civil Rights Laws, 3 TRENDS IN HOUSING
(May–June, 1959) (on file with author); Laws in 14 States Bar Housing Bias, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 1959, at R1.
305. See id.
306. See Note, supra note 172, at 525.
307. Housing Progress Seen by NAACP, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1959, at R1.
308. See Robison, supra note 128, at 58–61.
309. Black Papers, 1960 Metcalf-Baker—NYSCDH Still on the Last Lap, supra
note 61, at Box 10.
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Advocates had previously avoided restrictions on individual home
sellers. In his 1955 book, Forbidden Neighbors, Charles Abrams wrote,
“outlawing discrimination in one- or two-family houses would probably be premature in most places and invite difficulties.”310 Debate over
the 1957 Sharkey Bill, Black had argued that an attempt to regulate
owner-occupied housing would be “unworkable.”311 In 1960, however,
advocates argued that the failure to regulate these sales had public implications. “What an individual might do with his own owner-occupied
dwelling might be his own concern, so long as he did not put it on the
market. Once housing was put in the hands of a broker or advertised
our [sic] publicly listed; once it was up for some sort of servicing for
credit or insurance, regulation or protection by a functioning agency of
the housing industry . . . that housing offered for rental or sale was in
the public market.”312 Real estate brokers and boards, Black argued,
were “public functionaries,” and housing involved “crucial factors connected with the general welfare.”313 Arguing that “it is a fiction” that
the housing market was not publicly subsidized, Black commented that
“the housing industry had aspects of a public utility” and all aspects of
it should be subject to regulation.314
In addition to asking for the regulation of all housing, and the extending coverage of state law over the actions of real estate brokers and other
professionals, the new Metcalf-Baker Bill provided exceptions only for
the sale of homes when the owner negotiated privately with the seller
and for rentals of two-family homes when the owner occupied one
unit.315 Rockefeller argued that his bill was more consistent with laws
approved by other states and therefore more likely to pass, and he declined to support the expanded measure.316 While they called the bill inadequate, after months of negotiation and lobbying, activists accepted
the governor’s proposal, and the Administration bill passed in April
1961.317
310. ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS, supra note 39, at 357.
311. Letter from Algernon Black to Editor, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 17, 1957) (Black
Papers, Box 10) (on file with author).
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note 60, at Box 10.
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34, at 142–43.
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By the end of the 1950s, fair housing was enormously complex.
While policymakers increasingly acknowledged that housing discrimination was wrong, resistance among real estate developers and white
residents to integration efforts remained strong. At the same time, despite the passage of numerous anti-discrimination bills, drastic demographic changes in American cities increased segregation. The fair
housing movement could not cope with all of the social, political, and
economic aspects of residential segregation. In the late 1950s, urban
change had a particularly dramatic impact on the public housing program. By this period, public housing in most large cities was overwhelmingly minority. Efforts to reverse this trend would pose serious
implications for the principles of the fair housing movement.
VI. Integration or Anti-Discrimination: The Public
Housing Controversy

While most histories of affirmative action date the beginning of such
efforts to the late 1960s,318 proposals for government programs to provide racial balance have a much longer history. As advisor to the Office
of Production Management during World War II, Robert Weaver recommended several programs to promote blacks in war industries, but
these proposals received little support.319 However, by the late 1950s,
as civil rights activists continued to battle both discrimination and increasing segregation, demands for greater government action intensified. Race conscious measures became more palatable to policymakers
seeking solutions to deeply rooted racial problems.
As the history of the New York City Housing Authority’s (NYCHA)
aborted effort to achieve racial balance shows, these proposals raised
fundamental conflicts for progressive policymakers in general and for
the fair housing movement in particular. By pitting the desperate need
for affordable housing among poor New Yorkers against the goal of
integration, the NYCHA program put in stark relief the contradictions
of anti-discrimination law. The class-based nature of the housing authority’s program, which asked the poor to bear the burden in solving
file with author). The law was expanded in 1963 in accordance with most of the demands of fair housing advocates. See Robison, supra note 128, at 62–64.
318. See, e.g., W. ROBERT CRAY, THE FOUR FACES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 4
(2001); CAPLAN, supra note 32, at 17–18.
319. Alma Rene Williams, From the Black Cabinet to the President’s Cabinet (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University, 1978) (on file with author); Sigmund Shipp, Building Bricks Without Straw, in HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE URBAN
CRISIS: AFRICAN-AMERICANS IN THE INDUSTRIAL CITY, 1900–1950 227 (Walter Hill
& Henry Louis Taylor, Jr. eds., 2000).
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a societal problem, remains a crucial aspect of current battles over
affirmative action.
During the 1950s, public housing became increasingly tied to urban
renewal, and the focus of the program shifted from providing housing
to the “worthy poor” to providing support for private redevelopment.320
Since a large number of urban renewal dislocatees were minorities, and
because they were excluded from other housing opportunities, public
projects became the housing of last resort.321 President Eisenhower’s
HHFA Administrator, Albert Cole, stated explicitly that the purpose of
public housing was to shelter those dislocated by urban renewal.322 As
a result, at the same time fair housing advocates celebrated victories in
equal access, they began to worry that public housing was becoming
increasingly segregated. By the mid-1950s, fair housing advocates’
fears would become reality as projects across the country became
overwhelmingly black, and public housing became identified with the
ghetto.323
Attacked from many sides, public housing had always been a difficult
program to manage and support. As many projects entered their second
decade, maintenance needs increased at the same time that funding
decreased. Public housing projects were also hit by the increasing crime
rate that afflicted many cities. As these trends were emerging, public
housing became increasingly identified as minority housing. In New
York during the 1940s, two-thirds of public housing tenants were white.
By 1955, that number had dropped to one-half. By 1960, the percentage
would be one quarter.324 The role of public housing in creating segregated communities further heightened the already strong opposition of
many neighborhoods, making it more difficult to build outside of the
ghetto. At the same time, many civil rights advocates opposed further
development in areas that already supported public projects.325
Fair housing activists viewed the changes in public projects with
alarm. They had frequently pointed to public housing as proof that
integration could work, and now the buildings were becoming as seg-

320. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, at 124–125; PRITCHETT, supra note 10, at 108.
321. See Hirsch, supra note 96, at 220.
322. See Hirsch, supra note 96, at 220.
323. See Robert Weaver, Address at the 6th Annual Meeting of the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing (May 21, 1954) (Weaver Papers, Supplement, Box 6) (on file with author); PRITCHETT, supra note 10, at 115–117.
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regated as the other areas of American cities. Activists argued that by
placing public projects in predominantly minority areas, housing authorities had helped to entrench segregation.326 They also noted that
urban renewal projects, which displaced tens of thousands of minorities, combined with housing discrimination to force minorities into existing ghettos. As a result, they demanded that urban renewal programs
take into account their affect on public projects. “It seems clear, if
public and publicly-aided housing is not to retard but rather to promote
racial integration of neighborhoods” that new projects must be built in
undeveloped areas.327 The NYSCDH recommended that all public
housing be located in vacant land or in small sites scattered “interspersed with existing or newly developed private housing in nonminority concentrated areas.”328 The group also recommended that
housing authority management “adopt affirmative policies and practices
to encourage integration and non-segregation.”329
Housing advocates had certainly considered the use of quotas, but
had never specifically promoted them.330 Abrams waffled on the issue.
Assessing the viability of integrated public housing, Abrams noted that
there may be some cases in which the percentage of minorities “rises
disproportionately.”331 In such cases, he concluded “an effort to keep
the project in a workable balance is desirable.”332 Abrams distinguished
these efforts from “quotas,” however. “A quota system is a device to
exclude people, not to include them; to effect segregation not to break
it down.”333 If there was adequate housing for all, Abrams claimed,
segregation would not be a problem.334 “Until that has been attained,”
he argued, “the maintenance of workable communities during the development process is essential.”335 But Abrams avoided considering a
possible conflict between nondiscrimination and integration. Just a page
326. See id.
327. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, BACKGROUND OF RECOMMENDATIONS TO ACHIEVE NON-SEGREGATION IN PUBLIC AND
PUBLICLY-ASSISTED HOUSING (May 28, 1956) (NAACP Papers, Part 5, Supplement,
Roll 11) (on file with author).
328. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, TOWARD NON-SEGREGATION IN PUBLIC HOUSING AND PUBLICLY ASSISTED HOUSING
(Jun. 21, 1956) (Black Papers, Box 9) (on file with author).
329. Id.
330. See Note, supra note 172, at 538–39. On civil rights activists’ hesitancy over
racial preferences, see MORENO, supra note 11, at 88, 140–141.
331. ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS, supra note 39, at 311–12.
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later, he argued “[s]ociety has a duty to be color-blind in dispensing
aid or power in operating public projects.”336 In 1955, the NYSCDH
held a seminar posing the question, “what do we really mean by integration? Does non-discrimination necessarily include integration? Are
there any circumstances under which quotas are necessary?”337 Despite
the pointed questions, the meeting failed to produce a clear statement
of policy.
While policymakers avoided the issue, the small number of homebuilders who actively supported integration argued that quotas were
necessary to maintain integration. “Occupancy policy must be firm,”338
wrote builder Morris Milgrim. “Management must quietly decide on a
policy of no less than fifty-five percent white, and preferably sixtyseven percent white, and stick to it, by not taking deposits from Negroes
for more than about one-third of the lots. . . . Purchasers must be informed that ‘sales are two-thirds white, one-third Negro, and that’s how
we’re going to keep it.’”339 Milgrim, however, was in the small minority
of policymakers who directly confronted the issue.
In 1956, Charles Abrams, then chair of SCAD, participated in a
public debate with Warren Moscow, the executive director of the
NYCHA, over segregation in public housing. Moscow accused Abrams
and SCAD of “championing a quota system sometimes referred to as
‘planned integration.’”340 Abrams, Moscow claimed, had advised the
authority to maintain a “privately agreed upon ratio” of racial groups
in the projects, and Moscow responded that the authority “would not
pick out tenants on any basis except need.”341 Abrams denied that he
had recommended a quota system. He was simply “exploring” options.342 A month later, the two organizations issued a joint statement
declaring that “no controversy exists” in their policies of racial
integration.”343
Housing activists had generally avoided using the word quota, but
events would soon force them to take sides. In the spring of 1957, in
336. ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS, supra note 39, at 314.
337. Memorandum from Algernon Black to Members of the New York State Executive Board Regarding Seminar on Problems and Techniques of Integration (June
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response to allegations of corruption and mismanagement at the New
York City Housing Authority, Mayor Robert F. Wagner directed City
Comptroller Charles F. Preusse to conduct an in-depth study of the
organization’s operations and to make recommendations for reform.
The report’s most serious observations related to changes in the tenant
population. “We find the entrance of undesirable families into the projects, creating a hard-core of problem tenants, which, while small in
number, are the root of deep troubles both to their neighbors and to the
Authority.”344 Although Preusse cited no statistics to back his claim,
his opinion was that the increase in minority tenants was directly related
to the increase in “problem families.” Preusse recommended that the
NYCHA aim for a “more balanced population that would tend to remove any existing stigma from low-income public housing and would
also tend to raise the standards of social conduct within the projects,”
and he counseled the authority to take race and income into its admissions policies.345 While he did not recommend quotas, Preusse noted
that “some” people “occasionally suggest that percentage systems be
set up for the various racial groups who may be admitted to housing
projects.”346
Immediately after the release of the report, the NYCHA announced
the hiring of Madison S. Jones as Special Consultant on Race Relations.
Jones had a long history of involvement in the field, having served as
Race Relations Officer for the Federal Housing Administration, and as
Special Assistant for Housing of the NAACP.347 Jones was a board
member of the NYSCDH, the NCDH, the National Association of
Housing and Redevelopment Officials, and the National Housing Conference. His stated responsibility was to “guide the Authority on all
race relations matters” including “tenant selection.”348
Jones’s first major effort was an attempt to prevent further segregation of New York’s public projects. In February 1959, the NYCHA
established goals for the racial composition of its projects and instituted
a program that “encouraged families to accept apartments in accordance
with a plan aimed at achieving balanced communities.”349 In imple344. Letter from Charles F. Preusse, New York City Comptroller, to Mayor Robert
F. Wagner (Sept. 16, 1957) (NYCHA Papers, LaGuardia and Wagner Archives) (on
file with author).
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Press Release, New York City Housing Authority (July 17, 1958) (NYCHA
Papers) (on file with author).
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menting this plan, the authority divided its projects into four phases. In
Phase I projects, where the tenant balance was tilting towards a black
or Puerto Rican majority, white applicants received priority in admittance. Black and Puerto Rican applicants were only considered if there
were no whites interested in moving into the project. For projects in
Phase II, where blacks or Puerto Ricans were a majority, apartments
were held open for a period in anticipation of white applicants. Phase
III projects had a tenant body primarily white, and the authority encouraged black and Puerto Rican applicants. Phase IV projects were
predominantly Puerto Rican.350 In adopting this plan, Jones argued
that the authority was “trying to kill the idea that public housing is
minority housing. If we can get into this thing sensibly with the community groups, we can reverse the tendency towards segregation.”351
The integration program was initiated in some secrecy. NYCHA
Board Member Ira S. Robbins later stated that was because it might
be “misunderstood.”352
In the summer of 1960, Bernard Roshco, a former NYCHA staffer,
wrote an article criticizing the plan. In Roshco’s view, the policy had
achieved increases in integration in selected projects; in general it was
a failure. The policy, he argued, resulted in the Authority holding apartments vacant, sometimes for months, in search of white applicants
while eligible black and Puerto Rican applicants languished on the waiting list.353 In several instances, four-room apartments, usually reserved
for families with one or two children, were rented to childless white
couples willing to accept them.354 “Whatever the long-range benefits
that may accrue from the integration program,” Roshco argued, “the
immediate result for non-white applicants is a sharp reduction in the
number of apartments available.”355 Roshco questioned the legality of
the program, arguing that while “it is operating within the spirit” of
anti-discrimination statutes, a court would likely find that the NYCHA
violated the law.356 But the greater sin the authority committed, Roshco
argued, was “undertaking to act as a benevolent autocracy” by hiding
its policies “behind a fog of semantic obscurantism.”357
350. See id.
351. Bernard Roshco, The Integration Problem and Public Housing, THE NEW
LEADER, July 4–11, 1960, at 10.
352. Bias Laid to City in Tenant Choice, N.Y. TIMES, July. 4, 1960, at 1.
353. Roscho, supra note 351, at 13
354. See Roshco, supra note 351, at 12.
355. See Roshco, supra note 351, at 13.
356. See Roshco, supra note 351, at 13.
357. See Roshco, supra note 351, at 13.
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The NYCHA quickly responded to the article by defending its integration efforts. Chair William Reid held several conferences with
journalists, civil rights leaders, and with the State Commission
Against Discrimination, which had received complaints about the policy. Reid argued that housing managers were authorized to hold apartments vacant only when applicants were in process, and that the number of apartments kept vacant was very small. “Race does not take
priority over the criterion of housing need. There has been no reduction in the number of apartments available to non-whites. No apartments are restricted to whites only. There are no quotas on the number
of families in any racial group which may be admitted to any project.”358 Reid argued that the program was necessary to achieve the
goal of integration. “Mere compliance with the laws which prohibit
discrimination has not prevented segregation. . . . The authority is
faced with the necessity of taking affirmative action in order to overcome segregation.”359
The revelation of the integration program resulted in a flurry of interest within the city’s civil rights community, and most of them announced their support for the initiative. Twenty-six of them, including
the NAACP, the American Jewish Committee, the Citizens Housing
and Planning Council, and the National Council of Christians and Jews,
held a press conference to announce their approval. “We fully support
the objectives of the New York City Housing Authority . . . in its efforts
to achieve racial integration in the housing facilities it operates. We
have worked with the Housing Authority to advance that objective in
the past and will continue to do so in the future.”360 The New York
Times also declared the program sound, and it acknowledged the difficult task facing the agency. “The housing authority is trying to be
conscientiously against discrimination and against segregation—accident or otherwise—at the same time. It is not easy.”361
But the State Committee Against Discrimination, applying the state’s
anti-discrimination law, declared that it would undertake an investigation. Fair housing activists were put in a difficult situation by the ini358. From the Housing Authority, supra note 349.
359. From the Housing Authority, supra note 349; See also Integration Drive Set
for City Housing, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Aug. 28, 1960, at 1.
360. See Foes of Bias Hail Housing Agency, N.Y. WORLD TELEGRAM & SUN, Aug.
29, 1960, at 1; Act on Integration for City Housing, N.Y. J. AM., Aug. 28, 1960, at 1;
Bias Issue Stirs Housing Council, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1960, at 67; Policy to Cut
Bias in Housing Hailed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1960, at 47.
361. SCAD Against Integration?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1960, at 22. Three years
later, the Times would oppose race conscious remedies in employment. See MORENO,
supra note 11, at 149.
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tiative. NYSCDH members disagreed about the appropriateness of quotas, and despite the fact that former board member Madison Jones
requested the organization’s support, Black declined to publicly back
the policy. Because the organization was divided, Black chose to participate in the debate behind the scenes.362 Black was primarily concerned that the investigation not turn concerns about public housing or
integration into a political battle between city Democrats and the Republican state administration that would “be very damaging to the cause
of equal opportunity in housing and at the same time the cause of
integration,” and he tried to play a mediating role between the organizations.363 The members of the housing authority, Black argued, were
“people of integrity,” with a “sincere commitment in trying either to
maintain or bring about integration in public housing projects.”364 Instead of focusing on the quota issue, Black worked to “quiet what could
have been an ugly racial conflict in the political arena.”365
In his recollections of the controversy, Black agreed that “for a
black family that desperately needed an apartment and was not particularly interested in integration,” the new policy “seemed like a tremendous injustice, and it was.”366 The NYSCDH, however, waffled
on its opinion of the integration policy. In its first public statement on
the conflict, the group argued vaguely that “non-segregation” might
require management to “adopt affirmative policies,” but it urged that
“in carrying out such a policy . . . no eligible person be denied housing
in accordance with the preferences established by law.”367 Some activists, such as Councilman Stanley Isaacs, recognized that the values
espoused by the group conflicted. “We have been all out against discrimination. We all believe in proper integration. The present controversy proves that there can be conflict between these two aims.” Isaacs
argued that the group should take a stand. “I believe the effort to create
balanced communities should be authorized by law, even if it involves
a measure of discrimination.”368
362. See Letter from Algernon Black to Madison Jones (Sept. 27, 1950) (Black
Papers, Box 12) (on file with author).
363. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, THE
CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY AND THE STATE
COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (Black Papers, Box 12) (on file with author).
364. Id.
365. See Citizens Panel Seeks to Settle Racial Dispute in City Housing, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 7, 1961, at 1; see also Black Papers, SCAD, supra note 60, at Box 11.
366. See also Black Papers, SCAD, supra note 60, at Box 11.
367. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, PROPOSED STATEMENT REGARDING THE INTEGRATION PROGRAM OF THE NEW YORK CITY
HOUSING AUTHORITY (Sept. 1960) (Black Papers, Box 12) (on file with author).
368. Letter from Stanley Isaacs to Algernon Black (Oct. 6, 1960) (Black Papers,
Box 12) (on file with author).
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But the NYSCDH chose to take a less aggressive approach. While
SCAD continued its investigation, the group conducted its own study
of the integration program. In April 1961, the NYSCDH issued a formal
“Statement of Principles for Program to Effect Integration in Public
Housing.” The policy of the housing authority was crucial, the group
argued, because “the success or failure of integration in public housing
has an important influence on integration in other housing, as well as
on general acceptance of integration.”369 The statement raised familiar
issues about public housing projects and the role of urban renewal in
segregation, and it proposed several policies to improve race relations
in public housing projects. While the statement recognized that public
housing was “in a transitional stage which justifies special steps,” it
refused to take a position on the question of quotas. Instead, the group
proposed other methods to enable the housing authority to shape the
racial makeup of the tenant body.370 The statement suggested that the
housing authority stop allowing applicants to request a particular project and instead “adopt a set of objective criteria” by which to determine
which development to direct the applicant.371
In April 1963, SCAD Vice Chair Bernard Katzen issued the report
of his “informal” study of the integration program, a document that was
prescient in its analysis of the crucial issues that would confront affirmative action in the decades to follow. Katzen concluded that, in implementing the policy, the NYCHA had denied applicants housing on
the basis of race.372 Since the issue was central to the mission of his
agency, Katzen felt is necessary to provide a broader analysis of the
issue. In an “addenda” to his report, Katzen outlined the arguments in
favor of and against such quotas.373 Advocates argued that temporary
controls may be necessary to effectuate the goal of integration.374 “This
point of view,” Katzen stated, “calls for social engineers who are not
color-blind but rather distinctly color conscious.”375 Quotas, according
369. NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, REVISIONS TO STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES FOR PROGRAM TO EFFECT INTEGRATION IN PUBLIC
HOUSING (Apr. 11, 1961) (UNH Papers, Box 58, Folder 13) (on file with author).
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Report on Informal Investigation of Tenant Selection Practices and Policies of
the New York City Housing Authority (Apr. 9, 1962) (Black Papers, Box 12) (on file
with author). On SCAD’s views of quotas, see MORENO, supra note 11, at 128.
373. Report on Informal Investigation of Tenant Selection Practices and Policies of
the New York City Housing Authority (Apr. 9, 1962) (Black Papers, Box 12) (on file
with author). On SCAD’s views of quotas, see MORENO, supra note 11, at 128.
374. Report on Informal Investigation of Tenant Selection Practices and Policies of
the New York City Housing Authority (Apr. 9, 1962) (Black Papers, Box 12) (on file
with author). On SCAD’s views of quotas, see MORENO, supra note 11, at 128.
375. Report on Informal Investigation of Tenant Selection Practices and Policies of
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to proponents, serve “not only as a corrective agent but as an educational force in the community,” he concluded.376
Opponents, however, argued that quota systems are wrong “because
the slightest compromise with true equality of opportunity, even for
worthy ends, would open the way for the unbridled use of a quota
system for restrictive and discriminatory ends.”377 A quota system,
Katzen continued, “sets up an artificial situation in which progress toward a balanced community is actually retarded, in that it encourages
‘tokenism’ and accepts and perpetuates the concept that there are, in
fact, racial differences which affect a person’s desirability as a neighbor.”378 Katzen concluded that even if SCAD decided that quotas were
a good policy, the agency did not have the authority “to sanction a
philosophy of promoting integration through means which the present
law declares discriminatory,” and he declared that the program should
be discontinued.379
By the time the report was issued, the controversy had died down,
and civil rights activists were focused on other causes. Katzen’s report
had little impact on the NYCHA, which had quietly given up on integration by that time. By 1963, New York’s public housing was overwhelmingly minority, and the quota program had done nothing to stop
the trend.380 But the controversy raised issues that would continue to
shadow the fair housing movement.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s many working-class neighborhoods
in New York and elsewhere experienced dramatic racial change. The
roots of this transformation were complex, but many working-class
the New York City Housing Authority (Apr. 9, 1962) (Black Papers, Box 12) (on file
with author). On SCAD’s views of quotas, see MORENO, supra note 11, at 128.
376. Report on Informal Investigation of Tenant Selection Practices and Policies of
the New York City Housing Authority (Apr. 9, 1962) (Black Papers, Box 12) (on file
with author). On SCAD’s views of quotas, see MORENO, supra note 11, at 128.
377. Report on Informal Investigation of Tenant Selection Practices and Policies of
the New York City Housing Authority (Apr. 9, 1962) (Black Papers, Box 12) (on file
with author). On Katzen’s view of quotas, see MORENO, supra note 11, at 150.
378. Report on Informal Investigation of Tenant Selection Practices and Policies of
the New York City Housing Authority (Apr. 9, 1962) (Black Papers, Box 12) (on file
with author). On Katzen’s view of quotas, see MORENO, supra note 11, at 150.
379. Report on Informal Investigation of Tenant Selection Practices and Policies of
the New York City Housing Authority (Apr. 9, 1962) (Black Papers, Box 12) (on file
with author). On Katzen’s view of quotas, see MORENO, supra note 11, at 150. Two
legal scholars had recently reached the same conclusion. See Note, supra note 172, at
549–50; Note, Benign Quotas: A Plan for Integrated Private Housing, 70 YALE L.J.
126, 133 (1960). A judge in Illinois also concluded that such quotas were illegal under
Shelley. See Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp. 681, 707 (N.D. Ill. 1960).
But others supported the idea. See Oscar Cohen, The Case for Benign Quotas in Housing, 21 PHYLON 20–29 (1960).
380. Housing Policy of City Changed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1964, at 16.
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whites blamed African-Americans and other minorities for causing
declining property values and exacerbating “white flight.”381 White
working-class residents faulted government inaction for neighborhood
change. In later years, these residents argued that they were forced to
bear the burdens of racial integration that elites in the suburbs did not
have to endure. Several scholars and journalists have argued that the
rise of conservatism can be traced directly to the competition between
blacks and whites for housing and other resources during these years.382
While the reality of urban change was much more complicated, efforts
to create integrated housing did have significant class implications for
white and minority residents.
VII. Conclusion: Fair Housing in the Sixties and Beyond

In 1948, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that it was powerless to
prevent discrimination in the “private” housing market, and most policymakers believed that government had no role to play in promoting
residential integration. By 1960, the fair housing movement had succeeded in changing at least elite opinion on this matter, and it also
secured several legislative victories in pursuit of its program. The efforts of fair housing activists resulted in a dramatic reorientation of the
debate over the government’s role in race relations. As with other aspects of civil rights, the 1960s witnessed the flourishing of fair housing
efforts that led to the passage of the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968,
as well as the Supreme Court’s dramatic expansion of legal remedies
for housing discrimination. The period also witnessed the rise of an
active opposition to government regulation of housing. The story of
fair housing in the 1960s merits its own detailed treatment, but the
framework for the debate was established during the 1950s. All of the
major questions that would confront the movement were raised in its
formative stages. This conclusion briefly traces the fair housing effort
in the 1960s and thereafter, and then returns to some of the implications
of this history.
In the midst of his presidential campaign, John F. Kennedy energized
the fair housing movement by stating that he would end the federal
381. On the process of, and response to neighborhood change in this period, see
SUGRUE, supra note 112; GREGORY, supra note 197; GERALD H. GAMM, URBAN EXODUS: WHY THE JEWS LEFT BOSTON AND THE CATHOLICS STAYED (1999); PRITCHETT,
supra note 10.
382. See JONATHON REIDER, CANARSIE: THE JEWS AND ITALIANS OF BROOKLYN
AGAINST LIBERALISM (1985); THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS.
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government’s role in housing discrimination. Kennedy criticized the
Eisenhower Administration for failing to do more in the area of civil
rights. “One stroke of the pen would have worked wonders for millions
of Negroes who want their children to grow up in decency,” he argued.383 Kennedy’s statement was a great victory for housing activists;
an acknowledgement that the federal government had a responsibility
to prevent discrimination in housing. Fair housing activists were further
heartened by Kennedy’s selection for HHFA administrator. President
Kennedy nominated NCDH Chair Robert Weaver, making him the
highest federally appointed black official in history. “It was so logical,
it should have been inevitable—but can you believe it?” crowed Algernon Black.384
Advocates would soon thereafter have their optimism tempered as
Kennedy, afraid of a backlash from Southern legislators, delayed issuing the executive order he had promised.385 For the next two years,
the NCDH focused much of its attention on its “Stroke of the Pen”
campaign to secure the order.386 When Kennedy did finally address the
issue in December 1962, the order was much more limited than advocates had hoped. It applied only to housing directly funded by the
federal government, and only to housing produced after the effective
date.387 But the mere issuance of the order was a validation of the
principal that discrimination in housing was no longer acceptable federal policy.388
The early 1960s saw a flourishing of the fair housing movement
across the country. Aided by several grants, including a large donation
from the Ford Foundation, the NCDH published its first manual, The
Fair Housing Handbook, and expanded its efforts to nurture fair housing programs.389 By 1964, there were more than 300 fair housing groups
affiliated with the organization.390
383. J. Anthony Lukas, Integrated Housing: A Matter of Timing, REPORTER, Feb.
15, 1962; see also Black Papers, Needed—A Stroke of the Pen (Oct. 1961) (Black
Papers, Box 12) (on file with author).
384. Memorandum from Algernon Black to Members of the National Committee
Against Discrimination in Housing Executive Board (Jan. 4, 1961) (Black Papers, Box
12) (on file with author).
385. HENDERSON, supra note 34, at 167–69; CARL M. BRAUER, JOHN F. KENNEDY
AND THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 85 (1977).
386. See SALTMAN, supra note 56, at 52.
387. On the Executive Order Controversy, see MEYER, supra note 8, at 167–70;
BRANCH, supra note 8, at 679; HENDERSON, supra note 34, at 168–71; Lukas, supra
note 383; BRAUER, supra note 385, at 208.
388. See Memorandum from Frances Levenson to NCDH Board of Directors (Dec.
5, 1962) (Black Papers, Box 12) (on file with author).
389. See SALTMAN, supra note 56, at 62.
390. See SALTMAN, supra note 56, at 56.

CLASS AND THE LIMITATIONS OF FAIR HOUSING LAW

463

But pressure for open housing confronted consistent opposition by
white residents in most cities, and increased opposition by realtors.
By the early 1960s, most large cities were witnessing dramatic racial
change. Increasing housing production in the suburbs, urban fiscal crises, and declining housing stock coupled with the continued demand
among blacks for housing, resulted in the opening of new areas to black
settlement. In response to these changes, neighborhoods across the
country experienced “white flight”—the rapid change from white to
black. In some cities, whites responded violently to the arrival of minorities, and urban tensions increased.391
While most anti-discrimination laws had only recently been passed
and barely implemented, many whites blamed the fair housing movement for racial change in urban neighborhoods, and they argued that
they should have the right to refuse to sell their homes. In Detroit,
residents advocated the “Homeowners’ Rights Ordinance,” to protect
an individual’s “right to choose his own friends and associates” and to
“maintain what in his opinion are congenial surroundings for himself.”392 “The ordinance passed by a 55-to-45 margin.”393 In California,
resentment over neighborhood change was so high that it enabled realtors to secure the rescission of the state’s fair housing act. After the
legislature passed the Rumford Fair Housing Act in 1963, the California
Real Estate Institute undertook a campaign for a referendum to amend
the state Constitution to guarantee the right of a homeowner to “decline
to sell, lease, or rent . . . as he in his absolute discretion chooses.”394
Despite the efforts of the NAACP, NCDH, labor leaders, and the intervention of HHFA Administrator Weaver (who argued that federal
housing funds for California would dry up if the referendum passed),
voters approved the referendum by a two-to-one margin.395 Fair housing
advocates also experienced violent reactions to their efforts in many
cities. Among the worst incidents occurred in Chicago, where the
“Open City Movement,” led by Rev. Martin Luther King, saw a summer
of confrontation with white residents.396 In Milwaukee, fair housing
391. On the racial changes of the early 1960s, see PRITCHETT, supra note 10, at
147–151; SUGRUE, supra note 112; GREGORY, supra note 197.
392. See SUGRUE, supra note 112, at 227; MEYER, supra note 8, at 176.
393. See SUGRUE, supra note 112, at 227; see also MEYER, supra note 8, at 178.
394. See SUGRUE, supra note 112, at 227; see also BECKY NICOLAIDES, MY BLUE
HEAVEN: LIFE AND POLITICS IN THE WORKING-CLASS SUBURBS OF LOS ANGELES 308–
15 (2002).
395. See NICOLAIDES, supra note 394, at 179–81. See also SALTMAN, supra note
56, at 62; Thomas Casstevens, California’s Rumford Act and Proposition 14, in THE
POLITICS OF FAIR HOUSING LEGISLATION (Lynn W. Eley & Thomas Casstevens eds.,
1968). The referendum was later invalidated by the U. S. Supreme Court in Reitman
v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
396. See MEYER, supra note 8, at 186; on the fair housing battle in Chicago, see
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advocates, led by Father James Groppi, were assaulted when they tried
to march through white neighborhoods.397
Despite this opposition, fair housing advocates continued to press
for anti-discrimination laws, and they called on President Lyndon Johnson to increase federal efforts against bias. Johnson sent the first national fair housing bill to Congress in 1965, but the Civil Rights Bill
of 1966 was met with substantial opposition, and did not emerge from
a Senate filibuster.398 The rapidly changing racial politics of the 1960s
kept attention focused on civil rights measures, however, and in 1967
Johnson reintroduced the bill. In February 1968, Senators Walter Mondale and Edward Brooke introduced the fair housing bill as an amendment to other civil rights legislation.399 After some negotiation with
Republican Minority Leader Everett Dirksen, the bill was amended to
exempt individuals renting units in buildings where they lived and sellers who marketed their houses without the aid of real estate brokers.400
The Senate’s consideration of the fair housing proposal focused on
the impropriety of denying middle class blacks the right to buy a
house.401 According to Mara Sidney, advocates argued that the fair
housing law would help “black professionals who ‘deserved’ to escape
the ghettos, while their lower-income counterparts would receive only
the example of those departing to rekindle their belief in the American
dream.”402 In the floor debate over the bill, Senator Mondale argued,
“it is impossible to gauge the degradation and humiliation suffered by
a man in the presence of his wife and children when he is told that
despite his university degrees, despite his income level, his profession,
he is just not good enough to live in a white neighborhood.”403 The bill,
supporters argued, would enable the private market to work as it should.
JAMES R. RALPH JR. NORTHERN PROTEST: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., CHICAGO, AND
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1993).
397. See MEYER, supra note 8, at 190–94.
398. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE PRESIDENCY 127 (1992);
Richard Sander, Individual Rights and Demographic Realities: The Problem of Fair
Housing, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 874, 880 (1988).
399. See GRAHAM, supra note 398, at 128; Mara S. Sidney, Images of Race, Class
and Markets: Rethinking the Origin of U.S. Fair Housing Policy, 13 J. POL’Y & HIST.
181, 182 (2001).
400. See MEYER, supra note 8, at 206–07; Sander, supra note 398, at 880; Jean
Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J.
149, 154 (1969)
401. In her detailed analysis of the congressional debates over fair housing, Mara
Sidney points out that the focus on middle-class blacks did not occur in the deliberations
on the 1966 bill, but it was central to the 1968 proposal. Sidney, supra note 399, at
183.
402. Sidney, supra note 399, at 183.
403. 114 CONG. REC. 3421–22 (1968); see also Dubofsky, supra note 400, at 154.
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Those with the ability to pay would be able to choose where they
wanted to live. “The basic purpose of the legislation,” said Mondale,
“is to permit people who have the ability to do so, to buy any house
offered to the public if they can afford to buy it. It would not overcome
the economic problem of those who could not afford to purchase the
house of their choice.”404
In pushing for fair housing laws, legislators sought to allay concerns
of their white constituents that it would result in dramatic change in
their neighborhoods. Senator Brooke argued that the bill would not
“lead to a mass dispersal of the ghetto population to the suburbs; but
it will make it possible for those who have the resources to escape the
stranglehold now suffocating the inner cities of America.”405 The only
people who would move would be upstanding middle class families
that would contribute positively to their new neighborhoods. These
people deserved to live the American dream just like their white counterparts. As Robert Weaver had argued two decades before, these pioneers would be role models who would show that integration was a
good thing.
On March 11, 1968, the Senate passed the Civil Rights Bill of 1968
by a vote of 71–20. The House of Representatives debated its procedure
to consider the bill, but Martin Luther King’s assassination on April 4,
1968, brought a quick vote on the Senate measure, which Johnson
signed a week after King’s death.406 The Fair Housing Act of 1968
prohibited discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, and it allowed
aggrieved parties to sue for damages. It also prohibited discrimination
by mortgage lenders and real estate brokers, and it directed HUD to
adopt “affirmative programs” to promote fair housing.407
Three months later, the U.S. Supreme Court added to the law against
housing discrimination. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,408 the Court
ruled that section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 barred discrimination in the sale or rental of property.409 Reviewing the legislative
history of the Civil War Amendments, the Court reasoned that the Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress the authority to ban discrimination
in all property transactions, private as well as public.410 Writing for the
404. 114 CONG. REC. 3421 (1968).
405. 114 CONG. REC. 2279 (1968); see also Sidney, supra note 399, at 197.
406. See GRAHAM, supra note 398, at 129; MEYER, supra note 8, at 208–09; Dubofsky, supra note 400, at 162.
407. See Sander, supra note 398, at 880.
408. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
409. Jones, 392 U.S. at 413.
410. See Sander, supra note 398, at 879.
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majority, Justice Potter Stewart stated, “when racial discrimination
herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn on
the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.”411
Unlike the fair employment provisions of the Civil Rights Bill of
1964, which created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) to investigate claims of discrimination and pursue relief, the
Fair Housing Act did not create a new government infrastructure. Instead, the bill gave the department of Housing and Urban Development
responsibility for overseeing the law’s implementation.412 HUD Secretary Weaver argued that he needed $11 million dollars to create an
enforcement infrastructure. Congress gave him less than $2 million.413
Despite the passage of the act and the enunciation of Supreme Court
doctrine, segregation persisted in the decades after the passage of the
Fair Housing Act.414 In 1993, Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton released a major study that argued that segregation was still a fact of life
for the overwhelming majority of American urban areas.415 While other
scholars argued that integration had increased in some cities, all housing analysts agreed that segregation was the norm.416 Housing bias also
continued to restrict the options of minority Americans. In 1979 and
1989, HUD investigations reported that more than half of blacks experienced discrimination in their search for housing.417
In response to continued segregation in urban areas, many public
housing authorities and some private developers attempted to craft initiatives to support integration. The most famous example of such a
program occurred at the Starrett City development in Brooklyn, New
York. In order to prevent the project (which at the time was the nation’s
largest private housing development) from “tipping” and becoming
overwhelmingly black, the developers announced that they would im411. Jones, 392 U.S. at 442–43.
412. GRAHAM, supra note 398, at 129.
413. See MEYER, supra note 8, at 214.
414. See Sander, supra note 398, at 883 (explaining that integration increased only
slightly between 1970 and 1980).
415. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 10.
416. See Richard Sander, Housing Segregation and Housing Integration: The Diverging Paths of Urban America, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 977, 1009–10 (1998) (arguing
that integration has increased in certain cities and discussing models of segregation to
examine why). For other discussions and theories of segregation, see Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1965, 1985–90
(2000); DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS: CHANGING PATTERNS OF RACIAL SEGREGATION
(Gary Tobin ed., 1987).
417. See Kushner, supra note 27, at 933; see also JOHN YINGER, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION STUDY: INCIDENCE AND SEVERITY OF UNFAVORABLE TREATMENT
(1991); JOHN YINGER, CLOSED DOORS, OPPORTUNITIES LOST: THE CONTINUING COSTS
OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION (1995).
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pose a quota on admissions and maintain a strict balance of whites,
blacks, and Latinos.418 In 1984, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a
complaint against Starrett City, alleging that the quota violated the Fair
Housing Act. In a divided opinion, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that the quota was illegal. The court distinguished the case
from Otero v. New York City Housing Authority,419 in which they upheld
a program to support integration in a public housing development. In
Starrett City, the court found the “use of rigid racial quotas of indefinite
duration to maintain a fixed level of integration by restricting minority
access to scarce and desirable rental accommodations” violated the
Constitution.420
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Jon Newman stated, “Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act to prohibit racial segregation in housing.”421
Because the goal of the quota program was to support integration, Newman argued it was allowed under the Act.422 Newman asserted that the
Senate had neglected to address the issue in its debate over the bill,
because they “probably could not even contemplate a private real estate
owner who would deliberately set out to achieve a racially balanced
tenant population.”423 He concluded that, if they had considered the
question, they may well have approved such a program.424 In the aftermath of the Starrett decision, as well as other Supreme Court precedents
limiting the scope of affirmative action programs, the use of quotas and
other efforts at “managed integration” has declined in the last decade.425
418. See United States v. Starrett City Associates, 840 F.2d 1096, 1098 (1988).
419. 484 F.2d 1122 (1973); see also id. at 1134 (“Congress’ desire in providing fair
housing throughout the United States was to stem the spread of urban ghettos and
promote open, integrated housing even though the effect in some instances might be
to prevent some members of a racial minority from presiding in publicly assisted housing in a particular location.”).
420. Starrett City Associates, 840 F.2d at 1103. For discussions of the case and
others on housing quotas, see Rodney Smolla, In Pursuit of Racial Utopias: Fair
Housing, Quotas and Goals in the 1980’s, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 947 (1985); Michael
Tein, The Devaluation of Nonwhite Community in Remedies for Subsidized Housing
Discrimination, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1463 (1992); Richard Sander, Individual Rights
and Demographic Realities: The Problem of Fair Housing, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 874,
908–13 (1988); Comment, Benign Steering and Benign Quotas: The Validity of RaceConscious Government Policies to Promote Residential Integration, 93 HARV. L. REV.
938 (1980); Comment, Tipping the Scales of Justice: A Race-Conscious Remedy for
Neighborhood Transition, 90 YALE L.J. 377 (1980); Ackerman, Integration for Subsidized Housing and the Question of Racial Occupancy Controls, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 245
(1974).
421. Starrett City Associates, 840 F.2d at 1103.
422. According to Mara Sidney, the senators “almost always fell short during debate
of naming integration as the ultimate goal of the proposed law, even as they described
the segregated conditions of American neighborhoods. Sidney, supra note 309, at 208.
423. Starrett City Associates, 840 F.2d at 1106.
424. Id.
425. On the Supreme Court and affirmative action, see CAPLAN, supra note 32.
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Scholars and policymakers have criticized the Fair Housing Act for
several decades. In a 1988 symposium noting the twentieth anniversary
of the law, Arthur Flemming argued that FHA “did not have the teeth
it required if we were really going to deal with the issue of fair housing
in a meaningful and effective way.”426 Many critics argued that the law
prevented structural change because it relied almost exclusively on individual plaintiffs to prevent discrimination.427 The result, many argue,
has been that only affluent blacks have been able to use the Fair Housing Act as a tool for protection of their rights.428
In 1988, Congress passed the Fair Housing Act Amendments of
1988, which increased the penalties for violations of the law, and provided HUD with greater authority to investigate claims of discrimination. Professor James Kushner, a leading scholar of housing discrimination, argued that the law “dramatically strengthens the arsenal
available to combat housing discrimination and neighborhood segregation.”429 But, despite the increased funding and enforcement of fair
housing laws, segregation persists, and most scholars argue that housing discrimination laws remain weak. In 1998, Professor John Calmore
concluded, “among modern civil rights laws, fair housing persists as
the least effective.”430 Further, he argued, “[f]air housing rights have
been individuated away other than for affluent people of color.431
Many scholars have begun to question the ability of the fair housing
model to bring about integration. Calmore argues, “the rights-based
strategy of fair housing, as enforced by HUD and in the courts, is an
ideological victory that nonetheless has had insignificant effects in desegregating the metropolis and thereby improving the material life of
426. Arthur S. Flemming, The Politics of Fair Housing, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
385, 386 (1988).
427. See, e.g., James Kushner, supra note 27, at 933; John Charles Boger, Toward
Ending Residential Segregation: A Fair Share Proposal for the Next Reconstruction,
71 N.C. L. REV. 1573, 1583 (1993) (“[B]y most accounts, the Fair Housing Act has
been a disappointing failure”); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 10, at 14–15 (“As long
as the Fair Housing Act is enforced individually rather than systematically, it is unlikely
to be effective in overcoming the structural arrangements that support segregation and
sustain the ghetto. Until the government throws its considerable institutional weight
behind efforts to dismantle the ghetto, racial segregation will persist.”).
428. See Alex Johnson, Shaping American Communities: Segregation, Housing and
the Urban Poor: How Race and Poverty Intersect to Prevent Integration: Destabilizing
Race as a Vehicle to Integrate Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1595, 1632 (1995);
Kushner, supra note 27, at 932.
429. James Kushner, The State of the Union: Civil Rights: The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049,
1051 (1989).
430. Calmore, supra note 22, at 1071.
431. Calmore, supra note 22, at 1073.
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the ghetto poor.”432 Reginald Robinson asserts that the law “is absolutely incapable of specifically targeting the underlying social forces
that persist in the making and unmaking of urban ghettos.”433 Several
writers have called for a different approach to the questions of housing
segregation. They argue that housing policy should focus less on directly combating discrimination and give more attention to increasing
the supply of housing. A crucial aspect of these proposals focus on
efforts to force suburban areas to reduce zoning and other barriers and
accept their “fair share” of affordable dwellings.434
The history of the fair housing effort reveals that the limitations of
these laws were embedded in the principles of the movement. Fair
housing advocates sought to eliminate discrimination in housing markets, particularly for those who could afford decent housing.435 On that
limited issue, as evidenced by the increase in middle income suburban
blacks, the laws have been somewhat successful.436 While many fair
housing advocates believed that government should help to provide
decent housing for all Americans, their proposals against housing discrimination were not directed at this larger question.437 Housing affordability remains a crucial problem for Americans of all races, but the
roots of that crisis are more complex than the failure of fair housing
laws.438
In addition, the fair housing movement never resolved questions that
arose when the principle of anti-discrimination and the desire for integration conflicted. Housing discrimination and racial segregation,
432. Calmore, supra note 22, at 1127, citing Mark V. Tushnet, The Critique of
Rights, 47 SMU L. REV. 23 (1993).
433. Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Racial Limits of the Fair Housing Act: The
Intersection of Dominant White Images, the Violence of Neighborhood Purity, and the
Master Narrative of Black Inferiority, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 69, 109 (1995).
434. See, e.g., John Charles Boger, Toward Ending Residential Segregation: A Fair
Share Proposal for the Next Reconstruction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1573 (1993); Charles E.
Daye, Whither Fair Housing: Meditations on Wrong Paradigms, Ambivalent Answers,
and a Legislative Proposal, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241 (2000).
435. See Sidney, supra note 399, at 183 (“[T]he enforcement mechanism and other
features of the fair housing policy design were consistent with the rhetoric that supporters used to win votes for fair housing in a hostile environment.”).
436. On black suburbanization, see John Stahura, Changing Patterns of Suburban
Racial Composition, 1970–1980, 23 URB. AFF. Q. 448–460 (1988) (on file with author);
Thomas Phelan & Mark Schneider, Race, Ethnicity and Class in American Suburbs,
31 URB. AFF. REV. 659–680 (1996) (on file with author).
437. See Sidney, supra note 399, at 207 (“By embracing the classification of housing
as a free-market commodity, the fair housing policy rationale accepted housing patterns
that stem from differences in income—that is, economic segregation.”).
438. For the most recent data on the “crisis” of affordable housing, see Meeting Our
Nation’s Housing Challenges: The Report of the Bipartisan Millenial Housing Commission (2002).
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while they are intimately related, are not the result of the same set of
factors.439 Achieving racial integration would require an assessment of
the interaction of race and class in the creation of American communities. It would also necessitate a careful analysis of the complex nature
of the housing market and a rethinking of the government’s role in this
sector. Fair housing activists began to engage such questions in the
postwar years, but their proposals addressed only limited aspects of a
very large and complicated problem.440
During the past two decades, the number of black homeowners has
increased significantly, and it has increased somewhat for other minority groups.441 During the 1990s in particular, the number of AfricanAmericans living in the suburbs increased dramatically.442 In general,
blacks in the suburbs, like their counterparts in cities, live in segregated
neighborhoods. The intransigence of segregation in residential patterns
has led several civil rights activists to call for a de-emphasis on integration as a goal for the movement. Civil rights efforts should focus
instead on securing additional resources for black communities.443 The
Department of Housing and Urban Development under the Bush Administration, while it continues to profess support for fair housing laws,
has also focused most of its efforts on increasing minority homeownership. In the field of housing, policymakers from all parts of the political spectrum seem to agree that integration is not a goal that will be
attained in the near future.444 Declining interest in integration is the
result of frustration with the inability of legal rules to restructure the
complicated web of economic and social factors that shape American
communities. It is also the result of several decades of conflict over the
government’s role in promoting integration in schools and the workplace. This frustration lies primarily in the failure to understand the
complicated and conflicted roots of fair housing and other civil rights
laws.

439. See Sander, supra note 398, at 1009–10.
440. For an argument that affirmative action is only a small part of a broader movement for social equality, see Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment
on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327 (1986), at 1334.
441. On black homeownership, see Eric Belsky & Mark Duda, Anatomy of the LowIncome Homeownership Boom in the 1990s, in LOW-INCOME HOMEOWNERSHIP: EXAMINING THE UNEXAMINED GOAL 15–63 (Nicolas Retsinas & Eric Belsky eds., 2002).
442. See Area Black Homeownership Grows: Study Also Finds Region Profoundly
Segregated by Race, WASH. POST, Jun. 19, 2002, A1.
443. CAPLAN, supra note 32, at 57–58.
444. See Nancy Denton, Half Empty or Half Full: Segregation and Segregated
Neighborhoods 30 Years After the Fair Housing Act, 4 CITYSCAPE 107–22 (1999).

